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The Changing Game: The United
States Evolving Supply-Side Approach
To Narcotics Trafficking
ABSTRACT

Despite over two decades offocused government efforts,
drug use and related problems persist in the United States.
Moreover, combatting narcotics trafficking now may be more
difficult than ever as the sophisticated Call Cartel has
replaced the Medellin Cartel as the world's preeminent
supplier of cocaine. Cali's advanced methods of operation
have rendered traditionalapproaches to battling drugs even
less effective than they were previously. Clearly, the United
States must establish a new direction in drug law
enforcement. This Note traces the development of Colombia's
drug cartels from the rise of the Medellin Cartel to the
emergence of Call as the dominant drug syndicate. The Note
then surveys several methods, some traditional,some novel,
of combatting the drug trade, including extradition, military
intervention, irregularrendition, and asset attachment. The
Author concludes that asset attachment may be the most
effective and efficient means of attacking the heart of Call
Cartel operations, its extensive money laundering networks.
Finally, this Note discusses the Clinton administration'sinitial
approach to the drug problem, concluding that it is not the
shift in policy necessitated by the evolution of the drug
underworld.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 1993, the Clinton administration entered the
White House and inherited the formidable responsibility of
waging a national battle against drugs. Richard Nixon first
declared the United States war on drugs in 1971.1 More recently,

1. Joseph Treaster, Echoes of Prohlbition:20 Years of War on Drugs, and No
VIctory Yet, N.Y. TIMES. June 14, 1992, at 7. The United States established the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1971. Since that time, various Federal "Drug
Czars" have overseen DEA operations. Id.
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George Bush pledged his administration's commitment to the
cause; nevertheless, the drug crisis remains unresolved. 2 From
the outset, President Clinton's new drug czar, Lee Brown, 3 faces a
task arguably more challenging than that of his predecessor,
Robert Martinez, because of reductions in the President's
4 and attempts by Congress to reduce
Executive Branch staff
already insufficient narco-spending by 400 million dollars.5 The
new administration certainly shoulders an unenviable burden.

The United States drug problem is out of control. 6 Drugs
have had a devastating economic and social impact on the United
States. In 1986 alone, drug abuse caused 100 billion dollars in
economic losses including the costs of enforcement, insurance,
decreased work productivity, and health care. 7 Americans spend

Joseph Treaster, The 1992 Campaign: CandidatesRecords; FourYears of
2.
Bush's Drug War: New Funds But an Old Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1992, at
Al. President Bush had more experience than President Clinton in stemming the
flow of narcotics into the United States because Bush was Director of Central
Intelligence and led the implementation of Ronald Reagan's anti-drug policy.
(1) domestic law
Bush's anti-drug strategy comprised three components:
enforcement, (2) demand reduction through education, and (3) stricter border
control and international ventures. American Interests: A Drug War Scorecard with
Robert Martinez, FED. NEWS SERv., Sept. 6, 1991, at 1. None of these approaches
was novel. Partly for that reason, drug trafficking and use did not decrease
significantly during the Bush administration despite the dedication of
considerable funds to the war on drugs. President Bush, however, achieved some
success with an advertising campaign portraying cocaine as evil rather than

glamorous. Id.
3.

Lee Brown was formerly chief of police in New York City and Houston.

Id.
Carl Rowan, Drug Czar a Policeman, Not a Politician, HOUSTON CHRON.,
4.
May 1. 1993, at B 14. Brown is losing 83% of his staff as Clinton effects his White

House staff reductions. Although Brown's position has been elevated to cabinet
level, a much smaller staff and lower funding make his anti-drug coordination
efforts difficult. Id.
5.
Meeting of the International Narcotics Control Task Force of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 6989 (1992) (statement of

Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters)
[hereinafter Narcotics Task Force]. The spending cut proposals are a result of an
apparent lack of success in DEA operations. However, Levitsky insisted that the
Bush anti-drug program required four to five years before fruition. He also argued
that results achieved under that program were encouraging, notwithstanding an
increase in drug trafficking in the United States. Id.
6.
During a discussion of the then upcoming Andean drug summit in
Cartegena, Colombia, Bush administration White House Press Secretary Marlin
Fitzwater conceded, "[W]e have a drug problem in the United States. We are a
major user ....
" Thomas Ferraro, Bush Will Admit Nation's Drug Addiction, UPI,
Feb. 14, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (All wire service materials cited
throughout this Note are available in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
7.
James R. Edmunds, Note, Nonconsensual U.S. MilitaryAction Against the
Colombian Drug Lords under the U.N. Charter,68 WASH. U. L.Q. 129, 130 (1990).
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at least twenty billion dollars on cocaine consumption each year.8
In addition to creating an economic burden, drug use has exacted
a staggering toll on human health and welfare. In 1986, deaths
in the United States related to drug use numbered 4138, not
Including deaths from drug-related violence, which has
devastated the country's inner cities. 9 While the number of
persons using cocaine has decreased since 1988, 6.4 million
Americans still used cocaine in 1991.10 In that year, in fact, one
in eighty Americans used cocaine each week."
Colombia supplies eighty percent of the cocaine consumed in

North America, according to the Drug Enforcement Agency

(DEA). 12 Cocaine, in fact, is now Colombia's largest export
product, 13 and the cocaine industry is booming. 14 The United
States spends eight times more combatting drugs in Latin
America, principally in Colombia, than it does in the rest of the
world.' 6 These efforts, however, result in the seizure of less than
one percent of the twenty billion dollars in profits that Colombia's
drug lords earn each year. 16 Although Colombian government
Moreover, 100 thousand emergency room admissions each year and numerous
highway fatalities are drug related. Id.
8.
Phillip Bennett, Many Foes in the War on Drugs, BOST. GLOBE, Aug. 24,
1989, at 5. This number increased to 50 billion dollars in retail sales in 1990, but
decreased to 40 billion dollars in 1991 according to then Drug Czar Robert
Martinez. American Interests: A Drug War Scorecard with Robert Martinez, supra
note 2, at 1.
9.
Edmunds, supra note 7, at 129-30. Thousands of people die and
thousands more are injured each year in the United States from drug related
violence. Id.
10. Treaster, supra note 2. at Al.
11. Democrats Challenge Bush on Drug Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at
A17.
12. Colombia: United States May Request Escobar'sExtradition, INTER PRESS
SERV., Jun. 19, 1991.
13. Bruce Bagley, Colombia and the War on Drugs, Council on For. Rel.,
1988, at 70. Cocaine now ranks above coffee as Colombia's largest export. Steven
Y. Otera. Note, InternationalExtradition and the Medellin Cartel: Surgical Removal
of Colombian Cocaine Traffickersfor Trial In the United States, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
CoMP. L.J. 955, 961 (1991).
14.
The Colombian cocaine industry "is the Third World's first truly

successful multinational [industry). It is the most profitable business In the
world." Tina Rosenberg, Kings of Cocaine: Inside the Medellin Cartel, NEW REP.,

Nov. 27, 1989, at 28.
15. Ronald J. Ostrow, Remapping Latin America's Drug War from Bolivia to
Mexico, Governments are Getting Aggressive. One Sign of Success is Higher Street
Pricesfor Cocaine, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1992, at Al.
16. See Douglas Farah & Steve Col, Cocaine Dollars Flow Via Unique
Network, WASH. POST., Sept. 19, 1993, at Al. Not only does the United States
intercept only 1 out of 100 drug shipments, but some experts suggest that the
Call Cartel could operate profitably even if the United States were to increase its
current efforts by 2500%. Id.
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efforts have damaged the Medellin Cartel,' 7 the sophisticated
"gentlemen" Cali Cartel has more than filled the void left by
Medellin's demise. 18 Under the domination of the Cali Cartel, the
narcotics industry has developed increasingly sophisticated
techniques for concealing from detection its illegal activities. 19
Extradition laws, consequently, which historically have been
ineffective, have even less of an impact on Cali Cartel
operations. 20 In order to combat this highly organized and
efficient cartel, the United States and Colombian governments
will have to attack both the central members of the Cali
Cartel
21
and the soul of the cartel: its money laundering ventures.
The United States has already attempted three different
multi-national operations to slow narcotics trafficking. 2 2 For the
most part, however, these operations have fallen far short of
achieving their initial goals, and new23 strategies tailored
specifically to the Cali Cartel are necessary.
President Clinton has pledged that he will develop a
"carefully executed anti-drug" strategy that would focus more on
domestic drug education and treatment, a departure from the
enforcement-based drug strategy developed by former Drug Czar
Robert Martinez under the Bush administration. 2 4 Drug Czar Lee
Brown, however, continues to believe that law enforcement is and

17.

James Brooke. Call, the "Quiet" Drug Cartel, Profits by Accommodation,

N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 1991, at Al. The Medellin Cartel, under Pablo Escobar,
previously controlled 70% to 80% of the cocaine leaving Colombia. The cartel's
market share, however, has declined to roughly 40%. Jailing Escobar created
internal factions within the cartel and also provided other cartels with the
opportunity to increase their market shares. Id.
18. The Cali Cartel now provides 80% of the cocaine supply reaching the
United States. Richard Boudreaux, Chief of Call Cartel Fills Spot Vacated by

Escobar on Most-Wanted List, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1991, at A4. Another source,
however, estimates the Cali Cartel share to be closer to 70% of the United States
market. Linda Robinson, New Target. The Call Cartel, U.S. NEws. & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 23, 1991, at 28. Whatever the actual share held by Cal, it is clear that the
cartel has grown considerably in recent years and become an extraordinarily
lucrative enterprise. See Boudreaux, supra.
19. Robinson, supranote 18, at 28.
20. See Id.
21. See William Drozdiak, World Crime Groups Expand Cooperation, Spheres
of Influence, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1992, at A12.
22. Operation Green Ice, Operation Blast Furnace, and the Andean Strategy
are the three different operations that the United States has used to attempt to
slow the drug trade. The operations have had varying degrees of success. See
Infra part VI.E for a discussion of Operation Green Ice.
23. NarcoticsTask Force, supranote 5, at 59.
24. Greg McDonald, Brown Picked as Drug Czar, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 29,
1993, at Al. Clinton favors a system of "treatment on demand" for drug addicts in
order to curb incarceration and police expenditures. Id.
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must remain a vital component of a comprehensive anti-drug
25
strategy.
This Note examines Colombia's drug cartels, focusing first on
the Medellin Cartel and second on the now dominant Call Cartel
and its advanced methods of operations.
Next, the Note
discusses extradition and the ineffectiveness of that procedure as
a method of dealing with drug traffickers. The Note then focuses
on several novel approaches to combatting the drug problem,
including use of military force, irregular rendition, and asset
attachment. The Note concludes that asset attachment may be
the most effective and efficient strategy for attacking the heart of
the Cali Cartel, its vast money laundering operations. Finally, the
Note surveys the Clinton administration's initial plans for fighting
drug use in the United States.

I. COLOMBIA'S DRUG CARTELS
A. The MedellLn Cartel
1. Historical Background

The Medellin 26 Cartel grew out of necessity, as small-time
individual smugglers could not keep pace with the increasing
27
demand for cocaine in the United States in the early 1970s.
Carlos Lehder Rivas, a former Detroit car thief, recognized the
fantastic potential to make money if someone could organize
Colombian drug production and use privately owned airplanes to
smuggle tremendous amounts of cocaine into the United States
and other states. 2 8
Lehder began to collaborate with drug
operators in the city of Medellin and quickly amassed great
wealth for himself and his associates. 2 9 Though linked through

25. Id. President Clinton has focused on education and the plight of inner
city residents when discussing the United States drug problem. However, as a
former police chief, Lee Brown is likely to continue the Bush administration's
emphasis on extradition and crop eradication. Id.
26. Medellin is Colombia's second-largest city with a population of about
three million. Susan Benesch, Messrs. Clean: Medellin-Postcard;Medellin.
ColumbiaAnti-Drug Militias, NEW REPUBLIC. Nov. 2, 1992, at 10.
27. See Bagley, supranote 13, at 73.
28. See Id.
29. Id. at 74. Notable among Lehder's early partners in Medellin were Jorge

Ochoa and Pablo Escobar, who became instrumental in the rise to power of the
Medellin Cartel. See Id.
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this connection with Lehder, the drug leaders in Medellin initially
were unorganized and competed directly with each other for a
30
share of the profitable United States cocaine market.
The competition among the Medellin factions did not last

long, and its end may be traced to a single pivotal event. 3 1 In
November of 1981, revolutionary guerrillas kidnapped the
daughter of Jorge Ochoa, a key Medellin trafficker. 3 2 Rather than
paying the one million dollar ransom, Ochoa called a meeting of
Medellin's principal drug traffickers, who agreed with Ochoa that
the fortunes they had made rendered them attractive targets to
kidnappers.3 3
The assembled leaders united to form an
organization called Muerte a los Sequestradors (MAS) (Death to
Kidnappers) to protect themselves.3 4 Encouraged by the success
of MAS, the drug kingpins recognized that cooperation could
enhance their already profitable business.3 5 With Lehder, Ochoa
and his two brothers,3 6 Pablo Escobar Gaviria, and Jose Gonzalo
Rodriquez Gacha at its hub, the Medellin Cartel developed into a
37
complex and extremely successful operation.
38
The Medellin Cartel is not a cartel in the traditional sense.
A true cartel controls the price of its commodity by limiting

30. Id. at 73. Miami, as the center of the wholesale cocaine market in the
United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, became the setting for much of
the struggle for market control. Id. In 1981, the city witnessed 101 drug-related
murders. Id.
31. Peter Kerr, Colombia's Cocaine Lbrds: Conviction in U.S. Poses Little
Threat to Power, N.Y. TIMEs, May 21, 1988, at 15.
32. Bagley, supra note 13, at 74. A group known as M-19 abducted Marta
Nieves Ochoa Vasquez from the Medelin campus of the University of Antioquia
where she was a student. Kerr, supra note 31, at I5.
33. Kerr, supranote 31. at 15.
34. Id.
MAS quickly obtained the release of Ochoa's daughter by
assassinating M-19 affiliates until they set her free. Id. The Medellin Cartel used
MAS extensively in the following years to protect themselves and their families
from leftist guerrillas and to ensure the unobstructed development of their
business by terrorizing the Colombian Judiciary. See Bagley, supra note 13, at 75,

79.
35. Kerr, supra note 31, at 15.
An early act of cooperation was the
construction of a common cocaine production complex capable of producing over
seven thousand pounds of cocaine per month. Id.
36. Ochoa's two brothers are Fabio Jr. and Juan David. Bagley, supra note
13, at 74.
37. Id. The members of the cartel divided the labor among themselves so
that one member was responsible for production, another for air transport,
another for distribution, and yet another for security. The result was an operation
infinitely more efficient than each of the drug traffickers had been on his own.
See Bagley, supra note 13, at 74.
38. See Kerr, supranote 31, at 15.
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supply. 39 The Medellin Cartel has been unsuccessful at
controlling price and production, 40 and, in fact, many people
refer to the group more aptly as the "Medellin Mafia." 4 1 Although

the Medellin Cartel has been unable to control prices, the free
market has provided huge profits to the cartel, which would rank

highly among the world's Fortune 500 companies in both gross
sales and net earnings. 42
The majority of the Colombian population respects and
honors the Medellin Cartel. 43
Although many people and
organizations, including the Colombian government, fear the
Medellin Cartel, many Colombians are willing to help the cartel,
not out of fear, but out of respect. 44 The reasons for this
reverence are readily apparent. Prior to the development of the
cocaine industry, an oligarchy ruled Colombia. 45 Since the rise of
the cartel, poor farmers have become wealthy by growing coca
and processing coca paste. 4 6
Medellin Cartel members,
moreover, donate millions of dollars to develop desperately
needed and greatly appreciated housing projects and other
infrastructure throughout Colombia. 47 Many Colombians, in
fact, considered Escobar a modern day Robin Hood because of
his campaign to house poor Colombians called "Medellin without
Slums.""

39. Id. OPEC is an example of a true cartel. When it operates successfully,
OPEC limits the quantity of oil produced, and the price of oil increases. See Ol
Prices Tumble Sharply as OPEC Is Seen Faltering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at
D13.
40. Kerr, supra note 31, at 15. From 1981 to 1988, the wholesale price of a
kilogram of cocaine in the United States dropped over 60 thousand dollars to less
than 15 thousand dollars. Id.
41. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, Murder City: You Can Kill Someone for $10 In
Medellin Colombia, ATLANTIC, Nov. 1988, at 20.

42.

Bagley, supranote 13, at 70. By some estimates, the cartel earned profits

of two billion to four billion dollars a year during the mid-1980s. Id.
43.

See Joseph B. Treaster, Columbia Turns Drug War Into a Long Chase, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 10, 1989, at A10.

44. See Id. A senior Colombian official reportedly said, "Escobar and
Rodriguez Gacha are not seen as the bad guys in these areas. They move as freely
as fish in the sea. Nobody is going to help the police find them." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Approximately 500 thousand Colombians now work to support the
narcotics industry. Ron Chepesiuk, ColombianDruglord Trying to Turn Wealth Into
Respect, ORLANDO SENTINELTRIB., Nov. 10, 1991, at H1.
47. Joseph B. Treaster, Seven Indicted In 1992 Slaying of a Journallst, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 1993, at Al. Cartel members have built housing complexes,
roads, farms, and soccer fields. Id.
48. Sam V. Meddis & Twlgg Mowatt, Cocaine 'Godfather' Gives Up, USA
TODAY, June 20, 1991, at 6A.
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2. Effects on the State and the Judicial System

Although the Colombian cocaine industry has allowed several
drug lords to become among the wealthiest individuals in the
world, generally, the narcotics industry has decimated the
Colombian economy. 4 9
Colombia's cocaine industry costs
Colombia two billion dollars annually in economic damages and

law enforcement expenditures.5 0 Moreover, Colombia's struggle
to contain the industry has been bloody. In Medellin alone fortyfive thouand people have been violently murdered. 5 1

The fight

against drugs directly caused the deaths of 3 presidential
candidates in 9 months, 5 2 242 judges and other judicial
employees during the 1980s,5 3 110 people on a Colombian

Airliner,5 4 an attorney general, 5 5 400 Medellin policemen, 5 6 more
than 50 journalists in the past decade,5 7 and 16,200 Colombian
civilians in 1987 alone. 5 8
The Medellin Cartel, which maintained power and influence
through extreme violence, was responsible for most of the adverse

49. See Richard Boudreaux, Colombia; All Eyes In Drug War Now Turn to
Courts; but Even with Pablo EscobarBehind Bars, Few Expect the Flow of Cocaine to
Dry Up, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 21, 1991, at A5.
In addition to creating several
billionaires, the cocaine industry has provided Colombian farmers with the
opportunity to earn significantly more than they would be able to earn growing
coffee beans and other legal commodities for export. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at
29-30.
50. Boudreaux, supra note 49, at A5.
51. Medellin Wins Battles in CampaignforPeace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at
14.
52. Douglas Farah, Ruling Party Wins in Calm Colombia Vote; Threatened
Violence Falls to Materialize, WASH. POST, May 28, 1990, at Al.
The list of
assassinated presidential candidates includes Luis Carlos Garlan, who was
vehement in strengthening extradition laws, which greatly threatened the
Medellin Cartel. Id.
53. Stan Yarbro, A New Facefor Colombian Justice, CHRISTIAN Scd. MONrrOR,
Dec. 10, 1991, at 12.
54. Edward Frost, Escobar, Top Lieutenant Charged with Bombing Airliner,
REUTRs, Aug. 13, 1992. The United States indicted Pablo Escobar and Munoz
Mosquera for the deaths of these passengers. Escobar allegedly bombed the
airliner because a passenger on the flight was an informant. Robert Bonner. head
of the DEA, called this act of narco-terrorism "a vile, despicable, cowardly
terrorist act." Mosquera is currently in a United States prison awaiting trial. Id.
55. Twigg Mowatt, Jailed Drug Lord Loses Perks, Faces Renewed Prosecution,
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 22, 1992, at All. The Medellin Cartel killed Attorney General
Carlos Mauro in 1988. Id.

56. Brooke, supra note 17, at 1. Pablo Escobar once offered a 4,000 dollar
reward for each police officer murdered in Medellin. Id.
57. Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Two Charged In Anti-Drug Journalist'sDeath,
WASH. POST, May 11, 1993, atA3.
58. Bagley, supra note 13, at 72-73.
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impacts on Colombian society.5 9 When Colombia reinstated its
extradition policy in 1989, the MedeUin Cartel responded through
lethal force. 6 0 This governmental decision led to the bloodiest
period of narco-terrorism in history. 6 '
The kingpins of the
Medellin Cartel, whom the MedeUin press dubbed the
"Extraditables," promptly embarked on a war against the
Colombian government that raged until 1991.62 More than two
hundred bombings occurred in Medellin within six months in
1989 killing scores of people.63 Total Medellin Cartel-related
deaths during this bloody period numbered over sixteen

thousand Colombians."

No one in Medellin was safe, and the

risk was particularly high for judges, police officers, and other
65
government officers.
The quickest way to commit suicide in Colombia is to indict a
narcotics trafficker. 6 6 Colombian judges are in an unenviable
position. Judges can either indict traffickers and die or not indict
the drug lords and receive large "rewards."6 7 A DEA special agent
in Colombia affirmed that examples of violent threats are
abundant, saying, "To those who oppose [the cartel].., they send
a little shoe-box. Inside is a small coffin, inside that is a video
tape: it shows the target's child (whom he thought was safely
hidden in Switzerland) going to school; it shows his wife
(supposedly safe in Mexico) shopping. It is the death notice for
both [him and his family." 68 Protection of the judges is next to
impossible. 6 9 The Medellin Cartel could assassinate most judges

59.
60.
61.
62.

See Otera, supranote 13, at 957-61.
Id. at 972-73.
Id.
See Adrian Croft, Colombian Drug Cartel Threatens Attacks on its Main

Rivals, REUTERS, Jan. 6, 1992.

63. See William R. Long, War on Cocaine Turns Into a Bloody Standoff, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1989, atA6.
64. MaJ. Peter M. Sanchez, The "Drug War%- The U.S. Military and National
Security, 34 A.F. L. Rev. 109, 115 (1991).
65. See Infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
66. The Medellin cartel typically focuses on influencing the judiciary rather
than the Colombian legislative and executive branches. Otera, supra note 13, at
962.63. However, the Cartel has eradicated presidential candidates who have
publicly opposed the Cartel. Susan Benesch, Fugitive Wields his Power, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 30, 1992.
67. Gitta Sereny, The Sheriff of Cocaine City, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 2,

1990, at 2. Sereny concludes that even the most courageous Colombians usually
have no choice but to acquiesce in order to protect their families. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Tina Rosenberg, A Mess In the Andes: Colombia's Government-byCocaine, NEw REP., Sept. 18, 1989, at 23. One effort to protect Judges Is the
"faceless Judges" system, under which Judges' identities are kept secret. Drug
Lords Sentenced in Colombia, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 22, 1992, at 15A.
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with little effort despite the use by judges of bodyguards and
other protective measures. 70 Colombian judges, consequently,
71
must be quite brave even to indict suspected drug traffickers.
The Colombian judicial system is currently in shambles.
Indicting a narcotics trafficker often has little effect. 7 2 Even if a
judge feels bound to indict one of the criminals, only one in one
thousand is prosecuted. 73 Each judge receives four hundred
thousand cases each year and is able to process only seventy
thousand of those cases. 74 Courts dismiss most of the processed
cases because of inadequate jail space. 75 Judges, therefore, are
more likely to bow to threats because they know that, even if they
indict drug traffickers, they will not likely be able to convict
them. 7 6 Judges are said to have a choice: plomo o plata (lead or
silver). 77 The reality of this "choice," combined with the
inefficiency of the system, renders the Colombian judiciary
virtually worthless as an instrument for fighting the drug
industry

78

3. Current Status of the Medellin Cartel
Despite the ineffectiveness of the Colombian judiciary, the
intense focus of other segments of the Colombian govenrment on
79
battling the Medellin Cartel has produced dramatic results.
The Colombian government has severely damaged the
infrastructure of the Medellin Cartel through the destruction of

70. See generally Bagley, supra note 13, at 70. The most startling example of
Judges' exposure was the murder of eleven members of the Supreme Court by a
bomb placed the Palace of Justice. Id. The Medellin Cartel allegedly paid the M19 guerrillas one million dollars to attack the Palace of Justice. Colombian police
raided the Palace in an attempt to stop the attack, but the guerrillas destroyed the
Palace, and the justices perished. Id. At the time, the Supreme Court was
preparing to vote on the legality of the extradition treaty which, not surprisingly,
was eventually defeated. Rosenberg. supra note 69, at 23.
71. See James Brooke, Drug Baron's Jailing Heartens Colombia, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1991, atAS.
72. Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 23.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. On average, only one quarter of Jail inmates have been tried in court.
Persons who are ultimately acquitted often have spent several years in Jail. Id.
76. Id. Although a narcotics trafficker may not be convicted by a court, he is
unlikely to forget the judge who indicted him when he ultimately leaves prison.
Judges are keenly aware of this fact. Id.
77. James Brooke, Gavlrla's Gamble, N.Y. TIdEs, Oct. 13, 1991, at A38.
78. Id. The Colombian Judiciary is paralyzed by fear, inefficiencies, and
corruption. For this reason, the prospect of being tried in a Colombian court is
not very intimidating for narcotics traffickers. Id.
79. See Narcotics Task Force, supra note 5, at 19-23.
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labs and base sites, the arrest and assassination of cartel
lieutenants, and even the arrest of some cartel leaders.8 0 The
United States has also imprisoned several cartel members and is
using their imprisonment as leverage to gain more arrests and
more knowledge about the Colombian drug trafficking
organizations. 8 1
The war against drugs at the same time has taken an
Immense toll on Colombia. An aide to assassinated Colombian
presidential candidate Luis Carlos Garlan 8 2 clearly indicated the
effect of the bloodshed on Colombia, reportedly saying that "'the
price is becoming too high[;] [ihf the stability of the country
requires dialogue with the narcotics traffickers, we should do
8
it.,'

3

While Colombia has bravely pursued the Medellin Cartel,

the extreme bloodshed that ravaged Colombia for several years

ultimately prompted the Colombian government to alter its
extradition policy. 84
Decrees 2027 and 3030, issued by
Colombian President Cesar Gaviria, provided guarantees of nonextradition and reduced sentences for drug lords who voluntarily
surrender. 8 5 In 1991, the Colombian General Assembly finally
banned extradition entirely. This action prompted numerous
86
drug kingpins to surrender to the Colombian government.

80. Id. The number of labs destroyed is difficult to estimate, although the
Task Force avers that not enough have been destroyed to have a significant, longterm effect on cocaine production. Id. at 4, 19-23.
81. Hugh Davies, Cuba Regime Running Drug Racket, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr.
9, 1993, at 10. Carlos Lehder Rivas is currently in a United States prison serving
a life sentence for narcotics trafficking. The United States recently moved Lehder
from a maximum security prison at Marion, Illinois to a less secure prison in
exchange for his cooperation in an investigation of Raul Castro, Cuba's Minister of
Defense and brother of Cuba's President Fidel Castro. Raul Castro may be
involved In a cocaine smuggling conspiracy with the Medellin Cartel. Id.
82. Farah, supranote 52, at Al.
83. Otera, supra note 13, at 959.
84. Id.
85. Colombia: Pablo EscobarSurrenders to the Authorities, INTER PRESS SERV.,
June 19, 1991. Pursuant to Colombia's plea bargaining agreement, if the drug
lords did not voluntarily surrender, the drug traffickers would face severe
penalties including extradition. Cesar Gaviria, We Didn't Surrender to Escobar,
VASH. POST. June 30, 1991, at C7. These decrees, however, received mixed
responses from Colombian officials, some of whom considered the decrees an
admission of defeat at the hands of the drug lords. See James Brooke, Colombian
Kidnappings Are Gagging the Press, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 28, 1991, at A2. One
Colombian columnist argued that the decrees were "apact with the devil. This is
not submitting the criminals to the law. It Is submitting the law to the criminals."

Id.
86. Brooke. supra note 77, at A38. The list of drug kingpins who have
surrendered includes the Ochoa Brothers and Pablo Escabor. Id.; Joseph B.
Treaster, Drug Baron Gives Up in Colombia as an End to Extradition Is Approved,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1991, at Al. Hours after the Colombian Constitutional
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These surrenders, however, often took place on the terms of the
drug barons, most of whom were convicted of only minor
87
infractions.
In order to quell narco-terrorism, the government has
decreased the enforcement of anti-drug legislation.8 8 While the
government has continued to seize cocaine, it has not increased
its seizures sufficiently to keep pace with the increase in cocaine
production. 89 For a state devastated by years of ruthless fighting,
however, conciliation with the drug traffickers is apparently not
only acceptable, but preferred. 90 While some Colombian officials
argue that Colombia has capitulated to the drug lords by agreeing
to peace essentially under terms proscribed by cocaine
traffickers, 9 1 President Gaviria contends that the war on cocaine
has been successful. 9 2 Gaviria may be correct, at least as far as
the Medellin Cartel is concerned: Colombia's pressure on the
cartel helped to decrease its share of the United States cocaine
93
market to less than twenty percent.
With the escape from jail of Pablo Escobar, 9 4 and his survival
among friends throughout Colombia, it seemed possible that the

Medellin Cartel could again increase in strength. 95 International

Assembly voted 51 to 13 to ban extradition entirely, Escobar turned himself into
the authorities in return for a promised sentence reduction. Id. Escobar's
lawyers successfully obtained "a few" concessions, the most significant being
Escobar's right to construct his own jail. The jail, known as the "Cathedral," was
designed more to keep opposing factions out than keep Escobar in. Daniel Bland,
JailingDrug Baron Accomplished Little, TORONTO STAR, July 23, 1992, at A21. The
jail had televisions, gourmet food prepared by Escobar's mother, a full size soccer
Escobar also purchased the 11 farms
field, and various other amenities.
surrounding the prison. For most of his prison stay, Escobar also was able to
entertain visitors. Id. While the Colombian government was apparently tightening
its reigns on Escobar, he organized an escape, embarrassing the government.
Treaster, supra, at Al.
87. See Bland, supra note 86, at A21. Escobar, for example, denied all but
one of about 40 charges and qualified for a reduced sentence. Id.
88. Brooke, supra note 77, at A38.
89. See generally Charles Lane, The Newest War, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at
18.
90. See Brooke, supra note 77, at A38.
91. Tom Morganthau, The Widening Drug War, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991. at
32.
92. Gaviria, as President of Colombia, has attempted to quell terrorist
organizations in Colombia and has achieved the transformation of the M-19
guerrilla faction into the M-19 political party. The commander of the People's
Liberation Army, Don Fidel, has also changed his group from an army to a
political movement called "Hope, Peace, and Freedom." Id.
93. See Boudreaux, supra note 49, at A5.
94. See Authorities Comb Hills of Colombia in Search of Pablo Escobar,AGENCE
FR. PRESSE, July 23, 1992.
95. Michael Hedges, EscobarEscape Has Little U.S. Impact, WASH. TIMES. July
24, 1992, at A7.
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attempts to find Escobar initially produced few leads. 96 Escobar
often offered to surrender under his own terms, but, after his
escape and the criticism of the Colombian government that
ensued, neither the United States nor Colombia was likely to
97
agree to Escobar's terms.
A special 1500 man police unit finally killed Pablo Escobar
98
on December 2, 1993 after pursuing him for 16 months.
Numerous informants, interested in the substantial monetary
reward for Escobar's capture, assisted the police efforts. 9 9 The
days of dominance of the Medellin Cartel and their powerful
leader, Pablo Escobar, once having a net worth valued at three
billion dollars by Forbes magazine, are clearly over,1°° opening
the door for the unhindered development of the already powerful
Call Cartel.
B. The Call Cartel

While war raged in the neighboring city of Medellin, drug
barons in Call began to organize carefully and create a drug
cartel that eventually was to outstrip the power of the Medellin

Cartel. 10 1

Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela1 °2 developed the Call

Cartel and Is now considered "[tihe most dangerous, ruthless,
and powerful drug trafficker in the world" according to the United
States DEA chief in Bogota.' 0 3 Cali now controls eighty percent

96. Colombia: Government Accepts Escobar'sTerms, But Preparedto Capture
Him if He Doesn't Surrender, NOTISUR, Mar. 23, 1993. The United States and
Colombia offered a 9.6 million dollar reward for Escobar. Id.
97. See Bogota Drug War Set Back by Court, N.Y. TIMEs, May 5. 1993, at A10.
98. Jose De Cordoba, Death In Columbia: End of Pablo EscobarMay Slow the
Violence, But Not the Cocaine Trade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1993, at Al.
99.

Andrew Selsky, Drug Lord Barely Eludes Capture, CALGARY HERALD, Oct.

27, 1993, at A14.
100. Despite this decrease in Medellin power, authorities discovered evidence
of current ties between Medellin and new Russian black market capitalists. Police
captured well respected Russian chemists in a Moscow laboratory manufacturing
China White, a substance many times more powerful than heroin, for the Medellin
Cartel. These ties have apparently existed for the last two years. Marcus Warren,
Drug Lords Cash in on Russian Connection,SUN. TELEGRAPH, Oct. 31, 1993, at 30.

101. United States:

Colombia Cartel Blamed for Journalist's Murder,

INTER

PRESS SERV., May 10, 1993.

102. Harold Seneker, The World's Billonarles, FORBES, July 22, 1991, at 216.
Rodriguez and his brother Miguel Rodriguez are likely two other cocaine-created
billionaires. Id.
103. Tom Quinn, PassIon-Fruit Mousse with the King of Cocaine, SUN.
TELGRAPH, June 30, 1991, at 16. Id. Rodriguez is also known as "The Chess
Player" because of his intelligence and his ability to escape trial in the United

States. Id.
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of Colombian cocaine production,1 0 4 and the cartel earns about
twenty billion dollars a year from its participation in world
cocaine trade.10 5
In the wake of the tremendous violence surrounding the
"Extraditables" of the Medellin Cartel, Colombians are more
tolerant of the methods of operation of the Call Cartel. 10 6 Rather
than using violence and intimidation, the Cali Cartel prefers to
work with the government to achieve more peaceful solutions to
problems.' 0 7 Because of the cartel's more reserved actions,
people generally know less about it than about the Medellin
Cartel.' 0 8 Attracting less attention is, therefore, another benefit
of their more peaceful operations. The Cali Cartel, however, is
extremely powerful and dangerous. In fact, one DEA operative
reportedly said, "Cali is a monster. The Cali men are much
smarter than Escobar. They may not be as dangerous but they're
perfectly prepared to use violence when necessary. The difference
is that Pablo doesn't mind leaving his fingerprints behind. The
Cali men don't leave their calling card."' 0 9
The Cali Cartel is known as the "smart carter' and the "quiet
cartel."" I0 Cali focuses on bribery rather than on bombings,
kidnappings, and violent assassinations of uncooperative
officials. 11 1 Although Cali is the primary cocaine producer in3
Colombia," 2 it has not caused excessive government reaction."
The Colombian government, in fact, appears willing to accept the
cartel's quiet narcotics trafficking rather than clamp down on Cali
The
operations and risk another outbreak of violence. 1 14

Colombian government, therefore, focuses a much smaller
portion of its anti-drug operations on the Cali Cartel,
notwithstanding the tremendous power of this narcotics
organization. 115 Recently, however, sixty Cali Cartel members,
including several top members, have expressed a desire to

104. Id.

105. Phil Davison, Rivals Muscle In on EscobarDrug Empire, THE INDEPENDENT,
Mar. 23, 1993, at 13. cali's earnings are evidently about five times those of the
Medellin Cartel. Id.
106. See Thomas Ferraro. Bush Trip to Drug Summit. A Potentialfor Danger,
UPI, Feb. 10, 1990.
107. Id.
108. See Colombian Cartel Considers Mass Surrender,L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1993,
at A19.
109. Davison, supra note 105, at 13.
110. Ferraro, supra note 106.
111. See Id.
112. Quinn. supranote 103, at 16.
113. Ferraro, supra note 106, at 1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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surrender to authorities provided that the authorities meet
certain demands. 1 16 The United States, nevertheless, says that
the sixty members will not receive special treatment." 7 These

offers of surrender indicate growing pressure on the Call Cartel
1 18
and recognition it as a significant drug cartel.

Part of the reason for the increased attention focused on the
cartel may be that its methods of operation recently have begun

to more closely resemble Medellin Cartel tactics. 1 19 United States
officials accused Jose Santacruz Londono, 120 a leading member of
the Cali Cartel, of ordering the execution in Queens, New York of
Manuel de Dios Unanue, a journalist who reported on the
narcotics trade for El Dlarlo-La Prensa, a Spanish newspaper
published in the United States.' 2 ' According to Robert Bonner,
the head of the DEA in Washington, the Cali Cartel regularly
sends hit men into the United States to kill people who, for
12 2
example, have failed to pay promptly for delivered narcotics.'
Cali operations differ from Medellin operations in the method
of shipment of narcotics.L23 The Cali Cartel employs more
conservative, slow, and secure methods of cocaine shipment,
rather than attempting to ship the narcotics quickly by
airplane.'12 4 Cali also employs extremely sophisticated money
laundering techniques to create legitimate funds out of its illegal

proceeds.'

25

These funds have successfully created a network of

116. Michael Stott, Colombia's Call Drug Barons ConsideringMass Surrender,
REUTERS, May 7, 1993.
117. Id.
118. See Cali Cartel Leaders Negotiating Surrender,AGENCE FR. PRESSE, May 7,
1993, Although the Cali Cartel typically operates discreetly and avoids broadbased violence, both the United States and Colombia have begun to target Cali
Cartel members. Id.
119. See Ian Fisher, Jackson Heights Streets Familiar to Drug Cartels, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 1993, at B2.
120. Santacruz, known as Don Chepe (The Shepherd), is a real estate magnate
and club owner in New York. The funds to finance his business ventures come
from narcotics operations. Peg Tyre, Drug Don of Queens, NEWSDAY, May 11,
1993, at 83.
121. Stassen-Berger, supra note 57, at A3. De Dios reported on narcotics
traffickers and provided names and photographs. While reporting on the drug
trade in Colombia has always been a dangerous occupation, this is the first time a
reporter has been murdered in the United States for writing about the drug trade.
Id.
122. Joseph B. Treaster, Seven Indicted in 1992 Slaying of a Journalist,N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 1993, at Al.
123. See U.S. Links to Cartelin CallArrested, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 1992, at 3A.
124. Tyre, supra note 120, at 83. The Cali cartel often ships cocaine in cargo
ships, hidden in objects as varied as lumber, chocolate, pottery, shoes, lye,
hangers, and produce. Id.
125. Sereny, supra note 67, at 1.
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legitimate businesses that could eventually support the cartel12if6
the production of cocaine were no longer feasible in the future.
The DEA estimates that, in an area of New York heavily populated
by Colombians, some two hundred travel agencies, checkcashers, and international telephone services launder hundreds
of millions of dollars for the Cali Cartel. 127

III. EXTRADITION

A. Overview
The United States increasingly attempts to use extradition as
a means of battling drug traffickers. 128 Extradition, considered a
quasi-judicial process, occurs when an asylum state surrenders
an alleged criminal to a requesting state. 1 29 Treaties typically
govern extradition laws, but states occasionally practice
extradition out of courtesy.' 3 0
International law, however,
typically requires a nation to return an alleged criminal only if an
extradition treaty exists between the two states.' 3 ' Many states
do not recognize political crimes as extraditable offenses,
although most other offenses are considered extraditable.13 2 The
"doctrine of specialty" also mandates that a requesting state can
only prosecute an alleged criminal for the offenses for which the
33
asylum state agreed to extradite that individual.'
The United States prefers the extradition of narcotics barons
from foreign states because the foreign governments are often
unable to incarcerate the criminals because of the effect of
intimidation, corruption, and force on the states' judicial

126. Id.
127. Ian Fisher, supra note 119, at B2.
128. Jonathan Hafen, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual
CriminalityRequirement, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 191, 192 (1992).
129. Id.
130. See Id. at 202-03.
131. Andrew B. Campbell, Note, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional
Weapon In the War on Drugs, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 385, 399-400 (1990). The
United States has also followed this tradition since the 1840 Supreme Court
decision in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). Campbell, supra, at
400.
132. Charles Kallenbach, Plomo o Plata: Irregular Rendition as a Means of
GainingJurisdictionOver Colombia Drug Kingplns, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & Poi.Y 169,
175 (1990).
133. Peter S. McCarthy, Comment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez:
Extending the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine to Meet the Modem Challenges Posed by the
IntenrationalDrug Trade, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1993).
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Extradition of drug traffickers from Colombia,

however, has proved a difficult process. 135
often

LAW

narcotics

traffickers,'

36

The United States

but without

13 7
extradition laws these indictments are impotent.

suitable

The United States and Colombia first implemented an
extradition treaty in 1891 (1891 Accord). 13 8 Unlike the central
focus of modern Latin American extradition laws, however, the
1891 Accord did not discuss narcotics trafficking. 13 9 Under the
Carter administration the United States initially attempted to
control the flow of marijuana from Colombia through extradition
laws. 1 40 However, Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen
was unresponsive to United States demands and refused to
pursue legislation that the United States deemed necessary to
14 1
adequately address the drug trafficking problem.
Ayala 14 2
Cesar Turbay
Julio
President
1978,
In
concomitantly strengthened the power of the President and
43
established a closer relationship with the United States.'
Several years later, Colombia and the United States signed a new
extradition treaty. 4 4 Despite pressures from both the Reagan

134. See Campbell, supra note 131, at 386-87. As previously discussed. in
Colombia, the Medellin Cartel has essentially destroyed the judicial system.
Obtaining an untainted verdict is an extremely difficult task. See supra part
II.A.2. Drug kingpin threats, however, are less likely to influence the United
States Judicial system. Extradition, if available, consequently appears to be a
valid alternative. See Campbell, supra note 131, at 396-98.
135. Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee on InternationalDrug Control,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1989) (statement of Robert Merkle, Former United
States Attorney).
136. Id. The United States has indicted every prominent member of the
Medellin and Call Cartels, including Pablo Escobar, Jorge Luis Ochoa, Fabio
Ochoa, and Gilberto Orejuela. Id.
137. Id. If Colombia refuses to extradite Colombian nationals, the United
States cannot prosecute the drug traffickers, notwithstanding the indictments,
unless the United States is willing to take some other action.
138. Convention for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, May 1888 (U.S.Colom.), 26 Stat. 1534; see also Mark A. Sherman, United States InternationalDrug
Control Policy, Extradition, and the Rule of Law In Colombia. 15 NOVA L. REv. 661,
670 (1991). This accord was implemented early in Colombia's Judicial formation.
Colombia having adopted its current constitution' only five years earlier. Id.
139. Sherman, supra note 138, at 670. The United States and Columbia,
however, subsequently amended the accord to include "'[c]rimes against the laws
for the suppression of the traffic in narcotics.'" Id. at 670-71.
140. Id. at 674.
141. Id.
142. Ayala was a member of the Liberal Party of Colombia. Id. at 675.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 676. The United States and Colombia signed this treaty on
September 14, 1979, and it entered into force on March 4, 1982. Through
political and economic pressure, the United States coerced Colombia to accept
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and the Bush administrations, however, enforcement of the
14 5
extradition treaty has been less than successful.

B. Dual Criminality
A common feature of extradition treaties is a requirement of
"dual criminality," which means that the offense charged must be
considered a crime in both the requesting state and in the
requested state. 146 Originally, the purpose of dual criminality
was to force the asylum state either to extradite the desired
offender or to provide legal justification for not sending the
criminal. 14 7 Recently, however, states, including Colombia, have
used the dual criminality requirement as a barrier to
extradition. 14 8 Although the purpose of the dual criminality
requirement is to avoid frivolous extraditions and, thereby,
preserve individual liberties, the requirement protects persons'
149
rights less than it functions as a barrier to justice.
Nonetheless, foreign courts sufficiently value the sovereignty of
their states to uphold the dual criminality requirement and,
therefore, often unjustly protect criminals. 150 Colombia has been
able to avoid the extradition of various narcotics traffickers by
claiming that certain United States crimes, such as actions in
violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) and Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) acts, are not
criminal under Colombian law.' 5 ' Consequently, the United
this treaty. The United States agreed to provide certain military and financial
assistance only if Colombia agreed to sign the treaty. Id. at 676-77.
145. Kallenbach, supranote 132, at 185-190.
146. Hafen, supra note 128, at 191.
147. Id. at 194.
148. Id. at 204-07. The United States has required dual criminality since

1794 and uses it today in various treaties with foreign powers. Most of the
Colombians protected by the dual criminality requirement were lower level
members of the cartels, but Colombia also has refused to extradite drug lords
such as Pablo Escobar without providing any Justifications for their actions. Id.

149. Id. at 196. While claiming that they are merely protecting individual

liberties, states can use the dual criminality requirement to block extradition,
thereby impeding the prosecution of criminals who have often committed heinous
crimes. Id.
150. I.
Colombia would often rather block extradition of a criminal rather
than allow prosecution in the United States. The reasons for these actions vary.
,Pride, sovereignty, fear, and violence all affect the Colombian government. These

influences will not soon dissipate, and, consequently, extradition of narcotics
traffickers from Colombia will remain a difficult task. Id. Furthermore, Colombia

does not like to extradite narcotics traffickers to the United States because the
United States authorizes the death penalty for drug traffickers who have
committted certain offenses, but Colombia does not impose the death penalty in
any circumstances. Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 182.
151. Hafen, supra note 128, at 209-10.
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States has a difficult burden to establish dual criminality in cases
in which RICO and CLE are criticial to successful prosecution. 15 2
Dual criminality presents a second problem for the United
States. Under dual criminality, the requesting state must make
specific charges and divulge any evidence against the accused to
the asylum state. 15 3 The United States is often unwilling to
comply with these requirements, fearing that compliance might
compromise future trials in the United States. 15 4
Some
countries, such as Canada, recently have waived the dual
criminality requirement, but Colombia has not acted as
cooperatively. 155
C. Lack of Columbian Supportfor Extradition
Most Colombians do not favor extradition.15 6 Because the
Cali Cartel's methods are typically non-violent, Colombian
peasants are generally indifferent to it.' 5 7 Eighty-two percent of
Colombians, in fact, oppose the extradition of criminals for
trial.1rs
Part of the rationale for protecting cartel members
concerns fear and intimidation while another part concerns
appreciation of jobs and infrastructure development that the
cartel has made possible. 15 9 Given narco-trafficker influence on
the Colombian judicial system, efforts to stop extradition of
important cartel members have been extremely successful,
yielding only one significant extradition.16 0
The Colombian government does not fully support the United
States in its pursuit of extradition because it does not believe that
the United States is committed to the anti-drug war.' 6 ' The

152. See Id. at 210.
153. See Peter Eisen, Sharing Evidence: Colombia Seeks U.S. Help to Convict
Drug Bosses, NEWSDAY, May 3, 1993, at 14.

154. Id.; Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 176.
155. See Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 176. Colombia, consequently, has
not appeared ready to cooperate in the extradition process.
156. See Id. at 187.
157. Boudreaux, supranote 18, at A4.

158. Cecilia Rodriguez, Jailing a Feared Narco-Terrorlst Won't End NarcoTrafficking, L.A. TiMEs, June 9, 1991, at M2.
159. See supra part lI.A.2.; Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 182-86. The
Colombians find it difficult to earn a living through any other means. The price of
coffee has decreased 14 times in the last decade and is rarely a profitable

enterprise for Colombian peasants with antiquated farm equipment.

Foreign

corporations, rather, now reap most of the profits to be made through coffee
exportation. Id.
160. Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 185-87. The only significant extradition

was that of Carlos Lehder.
161. Id.
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"Andean Strategy,"1 6 2 however, was designed to bolster nations of

the Andean region through increased commitment of funds to
those nations, the development of Andean governments, and the
development of their national law enforcement agencies. 16 3 This
was a feeble effort, though, according to Rensselaer Lee, a drug
consultant at Foreign Policy Research Institute, who attests that
the Andean Strategy "is the least promising approach. We've
spent billions [of dollars] on international assistance programs
164
and have nothing to show for it."
Except for, perhaps, the unsuccessful Andean Strategy,
Colombia's case that the United States is not committed to the
drug war is strong. 165 When United States authorities videotaped
Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion S. Barry smoking crack cocaine
in a hotel room, he was convicted of only one misdemeanor
count. 16 6 More remarkable is that after being released from
prison, Barry has again been elected to public office. A further
signal to Colombia that the United States is not committed is that
when the United States decided to help Kuwait after its invasion
16 7
by Iraq, the United States expended billions of dollars in aid.
The United States even removed two portable radar units that
had only recently been set up in Colombia to inspect narcotics
operations and sent the bases to the Middle East. 168 A close
associate to President Gaviria reportedly said, "'Less than 20
Israelis were killed by Scud missiles, and yet they will probably
get another $13 billion in United States aid. Egypt gets $7 billion
in debt forgiven. We lose a thousand people here [in Colombia],

162. The United States spent 12 billion dollars annually on the Andean
Initiative alone. Michael McGuire, Airborne Police Wage Losing Battle in Colombia
Poppy Fields, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 1993, at C6.

163. Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs and Task Force on
International Narcotics Control of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1992) (statement of John P. Walters, Deputy Director for
Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy). The Andean Strategy

targeted states such as Bolivia located in the Andean Region of South America.
Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Brooke, supranote 17, at Al.
167. Id.
168. Douglas Farah, Meanwhile, What About the Drug War? Suddenly, U.S.
PrioritiesShifted --and the Andean Leaders Are Angry, WASH. POST., Feb. 24, 1991,
at B2. The Colombians justifiably argue that while hundreds of thousands of
people die world wide from narcotics-related incidents, the United States does

little to help. However, when a United States interest, such as oil, is in Jeopardy,
the United States acts quickly and forcefully. In addition. Colombia wants to
retain its sovereignty and will not allow United States military operations in
Colombia. The two states must willingly work together to help solve this narcocrisis. Id.
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and we can't, get $200 million in trade concessions.'" 169
Colombia is understandably frustrated with United States
actions. 170
D. CurrentStatus of ExtraditionLaws with Colombia
In 1989, the United States and Colombia, under the
guidance of President Barco, agreed to sign a new treaty. 17 1
President Barco valued the military and economic assistance of
the United States and wished to maintain good relations with
President Bush in light of Bush's promise to step up the war on
drugs. 17 2 The recent murder of Colombian presidential candidate
Carolo Luis Galcin also prompted Colombian cooperation.' 7 3
The new extradition treaty provides for the immediate
extradition of drug traffickers. Article 1 effectively denies the
Colombian legislature the authority to convene on the desirability
of extradition in any specific instances. 17 4
Article 2 denies
judicial review of extradition decisions relating to narcotics
trafficking. 175
Article 5 provides that any extradition request
supplants any pending criminal trial. 176
Article 7, however,
imposes a maximum penalty of thirty years imprisonment for any
Colombian national extradited and a "guarantee that the human
rights of the person extradited shall be respected.., in a manner
that is non-discriminatory with regard to those convicted in [the
requesting state]." 17 7 This doctrine is essentially the "doctrine of
specialty" found in most extradition treaties requiring that the
accused be prosecuted only for the crimes charged to obtain

169. Id.
170. See Id.
171. DECRETO NUMERO 1860 de 1989, No. 38,945 DImO OFICiAL 5 (18 de
agosto de 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Treaty]. The new treaty was issued as Decree
Number 1860 of 1989 in Colombia. Id.
172. Sherman, supra note 138, at 690-9 1.
173. See Id. at 692. Most of the Colombian population vehemently opposed
an extradition treaty prior to Galens assassination. Sherman subtly advances the
theory that the United States and President Barco may have conspired to have
Galn assassinated in order to create a reaction necessary to prompt Colombia to
endorse the extradition treaty. Galdn's murder is still a mystery and no evidence
Indicates that the assassination was carried out by drug traffickers or their
assassins. In fact, drug traffickers probably realized that such an action would
turn public opinion against them. Id. at 692-93.
174. See 1989 Treaty, supranote 171.
175. Id. art. 2.
176. Id. art. 5. This Article is especially important because it denies the
Judiciary the power to hold a drug trafficker who has committed some other minor
crime in Colombia. Id. art. 7.
177. Id. art. 7. This final Article decreases some of the threat of extradition to
the narcotics traffickers. Id.
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extradition. 17 8
Although the Colombian Supreme Court of
Judiciary on October 3, 1989 held that the 1989 Treaty was
unconstitutional, 1 79 Colombia and the United States still honor, if
not always abide by, the treaty.' 80 This disrespect demonstrates
the minimal the authority of the Colombian Supreme Court. 18 1
Colombia and the United States require more modem
extradition laws. 18 2
The United States, however, employs

minimal resources to rectify this growing problem. 183 The United

States, nonetheless, has specifically responded to Colombia's lack
of assistance in enforcing extradition. 18 4
United States
retaliations to Colombia's inaction on extradition matters,
however, have only incensed Colombian citizens and caused them
to harden their stance against allowing extradition of Colombian
nationals to the United States.' 8 5 According to an analyst of the
Colombian situation, "The U.S. campaign to extradite drug
dealers for trial in America has been blamed not only for the
assassinations but for the tear in Colombian pride."'

86

Colombia,

consequently, is not likely to ever extradite significant numbers of
narcotics traffickers to the United States, especially given
87
Colombian apathy toward the United States.'
Various commentators have proffered solutions for the
problems existing in current extradition laws. 18 8 One possible
solution involves a new resolution to the Tenth International

178. Campbell, supra note 131, at 402-3.
179. See Sherman, supra note 138, at 875. The Supreme Court held that
because the 1979 Treaty had not been formally withdrawn, that treaty merely
remained dormant and took precedence over the new treaty. However, given the
unconstitutionality of the 1979 Treaty, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 1989

Treaty was impotent and unconstitutional. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Sandi R. Murphy, Special Project, Drug Diplomacy and the SupplySide Strategy: A Survey of United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1290-92

(1990).
183. Id. at 1292.

Without better laws, other methods of combatting the

narcotics trafficking problem must be utilized.

One strategy, which the United

States uses with increasing frequency, is abduction of foreign nationals without
any foreign cooperation. Id.
184. Id. For instance, after the Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia held
the extradition treaty unconstitutional and Jorge Ochoa escaped from prison in
Colombia, the United States increased custom checks on Colombian travelers. Id.
185. Id.
186. Richard L. Fricker, A Judiclary Under Fire,A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 54.
187. See Murphy, supra note 182, at 1288-92. The United States is currently
seeking extradition of approximately 300 drug traffickers. The chances of
Colombia extraditing a significant number of these individuals are slim. Fricker,
supra note 186, at 57-8.
188. See Hafen, supranote 128, at 195.

1186

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IVol. 26:1163

Congress that would require requested states to set aside the
dual criminality requirement unless certain circumstances
necessitate otherwise.' 8 9 Another possible solution is to deem
the dual criminality requirement fulfilled when the drug trafficker
intends to harm the requesting state. 190 Extradition treaties
might also be altered to more adequately reflect the problems
surrounding the prosecution of drug traffickers. 1 9 1
E. Effect of the MansfieldAmendment on Extradition
The Mansfield Amendment, which Congress adopted in 1976
as part of the International Security Assistance and Army Export
Control Act, prohibits the unsolicited assistance of United States
employees or officers in foreign police arrests. 1 92
The
Amendment further bans any agents or employees of the United
States from even monitoring foreign police arrests of desired
extraditables.1 9 3
Consequently, the Mansfield Amendment
debilitates United States extradition efforts by limiting the scope
of the DEA's powers in conducting extraterritorial operations. 19 4
The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act altered the Mansfield
Amendment.' 9 " Under the amendment, the United States could
intervene in foreign arrests provided that the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State consulted on the issue, but, even then,

189. Id. These circumstances, however, include political and civil turmoil
within the requested state. Colombia would be able to claim rather easily that
such a situation exists in Colombia and, therefore, still be able to claim exception
and hide behind the dual criminality requirement. Id.
190. Id. One problem with this solution, however, is coercing Colombia into
agreeing to it. If Colombia wanted extradition to work successfully, the framework
is currently in place to sufficiently effect the prosecution of narcotics traffickers.

The Colombian government, however, although often voicing its desire to
prosecute drug lords, does not actually wish to promote extradition. Id.
191. Id. Problems, however, also exist with this possible solution. Colombia
wants to retain its sovereignty and decide whether certain criminals are, in fact,

extradited to the United States. Agreeing to a treaty alteration might decrease
this power. Colombia, consequently, would likely be difficult to negotiate with on
these issues. Id.
192. Murphy, supra note 182, at 1288.
193. Campbell, supra note 131, at 422.
194. See Murphy, supra note 182, at 1279. Because this Amendment greatly
hampered extradition activities, Congress altered the Mansfield Amendment to
allow the Secretary of State of the United States and a foreign government to
permit the presence of United States officers and other agents at foreign police
arrests. Direct participation, however, is still prohibited. Id.
195. Campbell, supra note 131. at 406.
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intervention could be only indirect. 196 The 1989 International
Narcotics Control Act' 9 7 further clarified and extended the
Mansfield Amendment.' 9" This further congressional alteration
of the amendment permitted United States officials to directly
partake in overseas arrests. 1 99
The United States Justice
Department also issued a legal opinion that the United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) could legally apprehend
United States, but not foreign, fugitives in foreign states without
the consent of the foreign governments. 20 0 Consequently, the
Mansfield Amendment now provides less protection to foreign
20
drug traffickers than initially perceived. '

IV.

VIABILITY OF A MILITARY SOLUTION TO NARCO-TRAFFICKING

A. Overview
Because of the minimal impact that other United States
programs have had on the Colombian narcotics trade, certain
commentators advocate a more aggressive United States role
through the use of the its vast military capabilities. 20 2 Operation
Blast Furnace was a United States attempt to use the military to
attack the drug trade. 20 3 This operation essentially entailed the
use of United States Army Blackhawk helicopters to destroy
cocaine laboratories in Latin America over the course of about
,four months. 20 4 Very few laboratories were located or destroyed,
cost over-runs were significant, and the operation incited ill-will

196. Murphy, supra note 182, at 1280.
However, according to a 1989
Amendment to the Mansfield Amendment, United States officials may take direct
action if necessary to preserve their safety. Id.
197. 1992 Pub. L. No. 102-583. 106 Stat. 4914 codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635.
198. Murphy, supra note 182, at 1279-81. Because of these alterations, the
Mansfield Amendment no longer performs the functions for which it was originally
designed. Id.
199. See Id.
200. Id. The Justice Department issued an opinion on June 21. 1989 that

actually extended FBI Jurisdiction over United States citizens who had fled the
United States for a foreign territory. Id.
201. See Id. The Mansfield Amendment, given its original intent, however,
does not appear to assist United States extradition efforts. Id.

202. Sanchez, supra note 64, at 140-41. Sanchez suggests that the military
may provide the best means of protecting national security given the necessity of
quick, conclusive action to terminate narcotics trafficking. Id.
203. Guy Gugliotta, Drug Wars-Hey, We're Winning!, WASH. POST, Feb. 11,
1990, at Cl.
204. Id.
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from the states in which it was conducted. 20 5 The lack of
operational success was not the only problem with Operation
Blast Furnace. Certain other problems also exist concerning the
legality of using military bodies to enforce federal and state
laws.

20 6

B. Posse ComitatusAct
Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act (the Act) in the
post-Civil War period. 20 7 The Act, applying to both federal and
state law, prohibited the military from acting as a law
enforcement body.20 8
Although the Act only specifically
delineated Army and Air Force action, the Navy and Marine Corps
also adhere to the statute. 20 9 One legal scholar argues that the

Act prohibits the use of any of these bodies to directly enforce any
2 10
laws, including laws against drug trafficking.
2
1
Certain exceptions to the Act exist. ' For example, as the
head of the executive branch, the President has the power to use
the military in emergency situations such as insurrection,
rebellion, and domestic violence. 2 12 In these situations, because
of possible consequences of inaction and separation of powers
concerns, courts have not enforced the Posse Comitatus Act and
have not declared the uses of force unconstitutional. 2 13

205. Id. One positive effect of Operation Blast Furnace, however, was that the
Medellin Cartel's use of the laboratories during this time period markedly
decreased. However, as soon as the operation terminated, cocaine production
regained previous levels. Id.
206. Sanchez, supra note 64, at 117.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1990).
208. Id.
209. Sanchez, supra note 64, at 119. Courts have also held the Posse
Comitatus Act applicable to the United States Coast Guard. An exception,
however, exists. The Act does not apply to the National Guard when acting under
the command of a Governor in emergency situations, such as natural disasters.
ICL

210. Id. at 125.
211. Id.
212. Id. Presidents have historically used this power in national emergencies
and have used it over 100 times since the power was initially created. Id.
213. See Id. One uprising that incited several criminal court trials occurred at
Wounded Knee, South Dakota in 1972. The judgments. however, only vaguely

referred to the Posse Comitatus Act. Id. at 121.
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C. Application of the Military to Narcotics Trafficking
Congress has attempted to pass legislation to stop the influx
of narcotics into the United States. 2 14 The proposed legislation

has included various plans both to stop the supply of narcotics
from Colombia and to quell the United States domestic demand
for cocaine. 2 15 In 1981, Congress, in an effort to enhance the

strength of operations against drug traffickers, amended the
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.216 The amendment did not allow
direct military intervention into civilian arrests of narcotics
traffickers but did allow the Department of Defense to supply
civilian law enforcement agencies with training, information,
This amendment
equipment, and general assistance. 2 17
prompted over ten thousand requests for this type of assistance
within three years. 2 18 The expansion of military contributions
was, therefore, significant. Since 1989, the Pentagon's drug war
budget has increased nearly three hundred percent to 1.2 billion
dollars. 2 19 However, the increased funding has focused on radar
nets around the United States which have had little impact on
220
drug trafficking or domestic cocaine prices.
Despite the 1981 Amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act,
the drug problem in the United States continued to expand
rapidly to epidemic proportions. 2 2 1 Incited by pressure from
The latest
constituents, Congress again amended the Act.

214. Id. at 122.
215. See Id.
216. Id. at 122-23. Congressman Charles Bennett, a Democrat from Florida,
proposed a strong amendment that would allow the United States military to
search, seize, and arrest drug traffickers (inside or outside of United States
borders). Id. at 122. While the final amendment provided only a fraction of the
liberties that Congressman Bennett proposed, he did initiate an important change
in congressional attitudes concerning the war on drugs. Id.
217. Id. at 122-23. Although the military was not allowed to act in a physical,
aggressive manner, it was able to make a valuable contribution to the war against
drugs. See generally Id. Equipment and more detailed information were required
to bolster domestic anti-narcotic operations. Id. at 123.
218. Id. at 122. While civilian law enforcement agencies had previously
requested and the United States military had previously provided assistance of
this type, the 1981 Amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act served to ratify the

occurrences and enable their widespread adoption. Id.
219. Charles Lane, The Newest War, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 18.
220. Id. The problem with increased radar surveillance is that while the radar
may detect a ship or a plane, the contents of the vessel are not detectable. Id.
Narcotics, consequently, conveniently slip through the radar net on barges and
ocean freighters. Id. The ease with which cocaine can be smuggled in that
fashion is the principal reason the Cali Cartel has shifted trafficking operations
from fast airplanes to slow cargo ships, See generally Id.
221. See Sanchez, supranote 64, at 123.
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Amendment both allocated more federal funds to the war against
drugs and provided for the central command and control of
military operations to monitor drug traffickers. 22 2
The
Amendment also called for enhanced military surveillance
operations to monitor drug trafficking before drugs enter the
United States. 2 2 Although the United States military still could
conduct only technically passive operations, their actions were

now more fundamental to a cogent United States anti-drug
effort. 2 24 If military operations exceeded initially desired and
proscribed limits, however, courts could put teeth back into the
Posse Comitatus Act and force a decrease in anti-drug military
225
operations.
Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States (OAS), mirroring the United Nations nonaggression
provision, provides that no state may "be the object, even
22 7
temporarily, of military occupation" 22 6 by another state.
However, article 51 of the United Nations Charter reads, "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations...
"228 The United
States could argue that, given the huge destructive effect that
narcotics have had on it, the United States was merely acting in
self-defense by attacking Colombia. 2 2 9 States have exploited the
self-defense argument to justify military intervention in other
states in certain circumstances. 23 0 This power, however, is
tenuous, 23 1 and any long-term organized military operations will
be difficult to justify without the cooperation of the invaded state.

222. See Id. During this time military opposition to fighting a drug war
became evident. Military personnel were arguing that being forced to fight a never

ending drug battle would decrease the readiness of the United States military
forces. Id. at 124.
223. See Id. Such surveillance operations would entail increased naval
patrols, AWAC flights, and enhanced Coast Guard operations.

224. See Id.

225. See Id. at 125-26. Noted commentators, however, asserted that if the
drug crisis continued, popular opinion would essentially force the issue to be a
political rather than a Judicial one. Courts would, therefore, most likely leave any
alterations of drug policy to the legislature. See Id.
at 126-27.
226. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 17, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 2420.

227. See Sanchez, supra note 64, at 129.
228. U.N. CHARTER art. 5 1.

229. Sanchez, supra note 64, at 130.
230. See Id.
231. See Id.
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Given Colombia's hostility to the United States, its agreement
to a military invasion is unthinkable. 2 32
Also, given the
opposition of the United States military, this type of operation is
3
unlikely to receive the support necessary to be successful.2
With the inherent problems of military intervention, short of
dropping a nuclear bomb on Medellin as former New York Mayor
Ed Koch suggested, alternative solutions to narcotics trafficking
are required.234

V.

IRREGULAR RENDITION AS A SOLUTION TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING

A. Overview
Irregular rendition is essentially a unilateral action by a state
to apprehend a criminal from a foreign state for trial in the
apprehending state. Irregular rendition may be an effective
alternative to extradition for bringing narcotics traffickers to
justice in the United States. 235 United States law, and probably.
international law, recognizes the legality of irregular rendition.23 6
United States law, however, does not specifically mention
abduction as an authorized means of international law
enforcement.23 7 Irregular rendition is essentially a self-help
measure that arguably may be warranted in light of the lack of
success of extradition in curbing narcotics trafficking. 23 8
B. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine takes its name from two Supreme
Court cases, Ker v. liinois239 and Frisble v. Collins.240 This

232. See Treaster, supra note 1, at 7.
233. Sanchez, supranote 64, at 130. Military strategists fear the possibility of

another unwinable war similar to Vietnam if United States troops attempt to
attack drug lords in their homeland. See generally Id. at 140-43.
234. Gilles Trequesser, Colombia Drug War Not Won But InternationalSupport
Guaranteed, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 1989, at 1. Mayor Koch's statement prompted

retaliation from the Medellin Cartel. The cartel attempted to assassinate Koch
with a car bomb, a typical tactic used to murder judges and other officials in
Medellin. Id.
235. Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 179.
236. Id. at 171-72.
237. Murphy, supra note 182, at 1296.
238. Kalenbach, supra note 132, at 173.
239. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).

240. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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doctrine represents the legal approach of the United States to
irregular rendition. 241 In both of these decisions the Supreme
Court upheld trial court decisions permitting the United States242
to
seize defendants in foreign states through irregular rendition.
The Supreme Court held that courts do not violate due process
merely by allowing defendants to be abnormally brought into the
custody of the law. 2 43 The United States, however, must indict
the defendant prior to his abduction 24 but need not attempt to
try the case prior to abducting the individual. 245 A trial
requirement would pose an almost insurmountable burden on
the implementation of irregular rendition. 2 4 The Court has since
applied this doctrine to both domestic and international
arrests. 247 The Court also ruled that this type of arrest does not
violate either due process or the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 48 According to the
Court, abduction does
not violate procedural safeguards in
2 49
administering justice.
Although the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Toscanlno2 50 initially appeared to limit the doctrine, the case
ultimately had little effect on the scope of the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine. 2 5 ' The court held that the district court had denied
Toscanino's pre-trial rights because of unnecessary lawlessness
on the part of foreign officials in his abduction. 2 52 The Supreme

241. KaIlenbach, supra note 132, at 195-96.
242. Id. In Ker v. Illinois, Ker was charged with larceny and embezzlement but
fled to Peru where a United States official kidnapped Ker notwithstanding his
argument that the United States did not have proper jurisdiction in Peru. 119
U.S. at 437-38. In Frlsble v. Collins, Michigan officials kidnapped Frisbie who had
fled to Chicago to escape a murder trial in Michigan. 342 U.S. at 520.
243. Campbell, supranote 131, at 410.
244. Id. at 411.
245. Id. The Supreme Court also held that defendants whom the United
States kidnaps are not able to invoke the protection of any extradition treaty that
may exist between the two states. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 197. An example is the arrest of
Ruben Zuno-Arce for the murder of two DEA agents. United States v. Zumo.Arce.
958 F.2d 380. 381 (1992).

248. Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 170.
249. Id. The Supreme Court thought that the defendant would still receive a
fair trial notwithstanding his abduction. See Id.
250. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). United States authorities seized Toscanino.

an Italian Citizen, in Uruguay against his will.

Toscanino was

accused of

conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics. Id.
251. KaIlenbach, supra note 132, at 200-05.
252. See Id. at 201. Officials allegedly kidnapped Toscanino after luring him
to a deserted area in Uruguay, took him to Brazil, tortured him for 17 days, and
finally drugged him and put him on a flight to the United States. Id.
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Court, however, had expanded due process rights since KerFrisbie, and, consequently, the Second Circuit felt justified in
holding that the government had violated the defendant's
2 53
constitutional rights.
In United States v. Lira,25 4 the Second Circuit limited its
prior decision in Toscanino. The court held that Toscanino limited

the Ker-Frisbie doctrine only where "the Government itself
secures the defendant's presence in the jurisdiction through use
of cruel and inhuman conduct [that amounts] to a patent
violation of due process principles." 25 5 The court held that
United States officials violated due process only when there was
256
affirmative proof of gross misconduct in the abduction itself.
Further clarifying its two decisions, the court held that Toscanino
provided an exception to the Ker-Frisbee doctrine only when
United States government agents or their representatives acted in
a "most outrageous and reprehensible" manner. 25 7 Specifically,
the court held that the Chilean police were not acting as agents of
the United States when arresting the defendant, 258 and,
consequently, the United States government was not "vicariously
responsible" for the actions of the Chilean government. 25 9 In
United States v. Reed, the Second Circuit affirmed, and further
defined the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, holding that verbal abuse of a
mail fraud defendant abducted in the Bahamas was not gross
2 60
mistreatment which denied the defendant due process.
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. AlvarezMachain2 6 1 has also recently acknowledged that federal courts
have jurisdiction over cases in which United States officials
abducted persons in other states and brought them to the United
States. 26 2 These court decisions merely reinforce a long standing

253. See Id. at 200-02.
254. 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). Defendant
Rafael Lira was convicted on a narcotics charge. Id.
255. 515 F.2d at 70.
256. See Kallenbach, supra note 132, at 203.
257. Lira, 515 F.2d at 70.
258. Id. at 71. The defendant argued that United States officials were present
when Chilean police tortured him. The United States Drug Enforcement Agency,

however, denied being present, and the court record reflected no other indication
that the United States was present or authorized his mistreatment. Id.
259. Id.
260. 639 F.2d 896, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1981).
261. 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992). United States officials abducted Humberto
Alvarez-Machain in Mexico for the kidnapping and murder of a United States DEA
agent. Id.
262. Id.
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26
United States policy of mala captus bene detonates. 3
Consequently, although some commentators criticize Ker-Frtsbie,
the United States government may be able to use the doctrine to
effect
the
prosecution
of Colombian
narco-traffickers

successfully.

264

The Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain examined the issue of

"whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States
from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby
"2 65
acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country's courts.
The district court concluded that DEA agents were indirectly
responsible for the defendant's abduction from Mexico to the
United States. 2 66 The court of appeals agreed with the district
court that because the Mexican-United States Extradition Treaty
did not specifically allow this abduction, the abduction violated
the treaty.2 67 The court of appeals held that, although the treaty
did not specifically prohibit such adbuctions, the actions violated
the "purpose" of the extradition treaty. 2 68 The Supreme Court,
however, held that because the treaty, which was amended in
1978, did not attempt to curtail the Ker-Frisble doctrine, the
treaty does not impliedly prohibit abductions outside the scope of
the treaty.2 69 According to the Court, the treaty does not attempt
to delineate every allowable manner of extradition. 270 For the
treaty to impliedly prohibit this type of abduction would be an
irrational leap of logic. 27 1 Consequently, the Court held, the

United States did not violate the extradition treaty and the
doctrine of Ker v. illnois was "fully applicable to -this case. The
fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not therefore prohibit

263. See KaIlenbach, supra note 132, at 171. This doctrine essentially means

that abduction of an accused person does not necessarily preclude federal court
Jurisdiction. This is true even if the abduction was, in fact, illegal. Id.
264. Id, at 171-73.
265. Alverez-Machaln, 112 S.Ct. at 2190.

266, Id.
267. Id. The lower courts believed that because the United States violated the
Treaty, the courts did not have Jurisdiction over the defendant. They held,
therefore, that the United States should dismiss the indictment and order the
repatriation of the defendant to Mexico. Id. at 2190-91.
268. Id. at 2191. Article 9 of the Treaty states, in part, "Neither Contracting
Party shall be bound to deliver up Its own nationals, but the executive authority of
the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party, have the
power to deliver them up if, in Its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so." Id. at
2193.
269. Id. at 2194.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 2196.
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his trial in a court in the United States for violations of the
2 72
criminal laws of the United States."
Critics of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine claim that the policy is
unconstitutional. 2 73 Other commentators argue that the doctrine
274
violates international treaties by ignoring extradition laws.
These commentators further argue that the United States
Constitution applies to both foreign and domestic government
actions. 27 5 They assert that abduction consequently violates
27 7
both the Fourth Amendment 2 7 6 and the Fifth Amendment.
However, these arguments find little justffication, 278 and clearly

represent the view of a minority of commentators on the
doctrine.

279

VI. ASSET ATTACHMENT AND MONEY

LAUNDERING

A. Overview
The dollar drives nearly every activity in the world,28 0 and the
Call Cartel's activities are not exceptions to this rule. The cartel
hires the best attorneys and financial advisors to hide their illicit
cocaine related earnings. 2 81 Often huge deposits of cocaine
money provide the necessary seed capital to start legitimate

272. Id. at 2197.
273. See Id.
274. Id. The critics argue that the United States should give more respect to
the preservation and observance of international treaties. Id.
275. Id. Notwithstanding these criticisms, the validity of such claims does not
appear to derive support from Supreme Court decisions. Johnson v. Elsentrager.
339 U.S. 763 (1950), establishes that constitutional protections do not apply to

aliens outside the United States. Id. at 768.
276. The Fourth Amendment delineates a person's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
277. The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall be deprived of life or
liberty without due process. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

278. Most Constitutional scholars argue that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments are only applicable to domestic issues and do not address actions in
foreign states. In fact, the court in Lira specifically held that when the United
States does not play any role in gross misconduct in the abduction of a defendant,
the United States does not owe the defendant any obligation to enforce his
asserted rights in the foreign state. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 71-72 (2d
Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
279. Id.
280. See Peter J. Kacarab, An Indepth Analysis of the New Money Laundering
Statutes, 8 AKRONTAX J. 1, 2 (1991).
281. See William Drozdiak. World Crime Groups Expand Cooperation. Spheres
of Influence, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1992, at A12.
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businesses that, in turn, further finance the Cali Cartel and help
create an invincible, diversified, and legal empire.2 8 2 Although
difficult, disrupting the economic incentives of the narcotics
industry may prove more fruitful than attempts to ebb the tide of
drug trading through extradition and military operations. a
Congress recently has recognized the influence of economics and
implemented anti-drug legislation that targets the financial
transactions connected with narcotics trafficking, rather than the
trafficking activity itself.284

The Cali Cartel employs sophisticated money laundering
techniques to hide and legitimatize their narcotics derived
wealth. 285 Money laundering is essentially the act of "washing"
il-gotten gains so as to provide the funds with an appearance of
legitimacy. 28 6
This operation may be either basic or
sophisticated; however, the fundamental similarity of all money
laundering operations is the desire of the recipients of the illegal
money to conceal the source and derivation of the funds. 2 87
The Cali Cartel has also recently developed an illicit money
trading market to help move illegally acquired funds out of the
United States and into Colombia. 2 8 8 This system involves the use
of independent Colombian money brokers who guarantee to
remove large blocks of funds from the United States, launder the
funds in Colombia, and pay the Cali Cartel in Colombian
Currency. For completing this transaction, the money brokers
receive a large commission, approximately twenty to thirty
percent of the total cash block, depending upon the difficulty of
the transaction. 2 8 9
Losing the money, however, can be
dangerous because the cartel often keeps "friends" in the homes

282. Kacarab, supra note 280, at 3.
These businesses are extremely
diversified in the garment, foodstuffs, and even heavy industry areas.
Consequently, the Cartel is able to decrease investment risk by spreading their
funds among various industries. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1. These statutes essentially prosecute any use of illicitly obtained
funds to further bolster the illegal activity, avoid taxation consequences, or
conceal the nature of the illegal income. Id.
285. See Id.

286. Id. at 2.
287. Laura M.L. Maroldy, Note, Recordkeeplng and Reporting in an Attempt to
Stop the Money Laundering Cycle: Why Blanket Recording and Reporting of Wire
and Electronic Funds Transfers is Not the Answer, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863.
866-67 (1991).
288. Douglas Farah & Steve Coil. Cocaine Dollars Flow VIa Unique Network,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1993, at Al.
289. Id.
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of these money brokers to ensure their commitment to the
290
transactions.
B. Asset Fotfelture
Asset forfeiture may prove to be the most productive method
of curbing narcotics trafficking. 2 9 1
Congress designed the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
(Drug Abuse Act) to curb narcotics trafficking by strengthening
292
penalties for the receipt or use of illegally derived money.
Congress amended the Drug Abuse Act in 1984 to include
continuing criminal enterprises and an enhanced forfeiture
293
provision to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the Act.
The Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the Drug Abuse Act
in 1989 in Caplin & Drysdale v. United States. 2 94 The Court held
that the defense attorney who represented Christopher
Reckmeyer, the narcotics trafficker in the underlying decision,
was not entitled to payment of his legal fees. 2 95 Caplin &
Drysdale, the petitioner law firm, argued that the lower court's
denying payment to the firm for representation of defendant
297
Reckmeyer violated his sixth amendment 296 right to counsel.
Caplin & Drysdale also challenged the court's order as a violation
2 99
of defendant's Fifth Amendment 29 8 due process rights.
The Court addressed both of these constitutional challenges.
On the issue of the violation of the Sixth Amendment, the Court
asserted that Wheat v. United States304 established that a
defendant did not have an absolute right to any attorney, but
only the right to an attorney that the defendant could afford with

290. Id.
291. Grace E. Greer, Cocaine Wars: Are the Taxpayers Really Winning?, 20
Sw. U. L. REv. 419, 420 (1991).
292. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.

No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236.
293. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 824, 848, & 881 (Supp. 1990).
294. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
295. Id. at 2656.
296. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.").
297. 109 S. Ct. at 2651. The attorneys' fees were not to be paid because
defendant Reckmeyer pled guilty and as a result the forfeiture provisions of the
Drug Abuse Act were applicable and denied the defendant any benefits from the
seized assets. Id. at 2652-53.
298. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law").
299. Id.
300. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
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his legitimate assets.3 0 1 Because Reckmeyer's assets were not
legitimate but obtained from marijuana trafficking, Caplin &
Drysdale was not entitled to attorneys' fees.3 0 2

The Court next

addressed the issue concerning the Fifth Amendment rights of
the defendant.3 0 3

The Court held that because the defendant

received proper adjudication under the Sixth Amendment, the
defendant's due process rights were not violated. 30 4
The
petitioner, consequently, was not entitled to payment of legal

fees. 3

05

The Drug Abuse Act also strengthened civil forfeiture in

connection with trafficking in illegal substances.3 0 6 'Congress
amended the 1970 Act in 1978 to allow the government also to
seize the proceeds from the sale of illegal narcotics.3 0 7 Further,
Congress passed the Money Laundering Controls Act in 1986 in
an attempt to strengthen the United States government's ability
to seize assets obtained from illicit activities.3 0 8 Prior law "had
focused on prosecuting evasion of currency transaction reporting
requirements. 3 0 9 The 1986 Act, however, broadly applies to any
assets associated with narcotics and any other illegally obtained
assets.3 10 A money laundering conviction results in forfeiture of
any property associated with the offense. 3 1 ' Under this statute
even an accountant who had nothing to do with actual narcotics

trafficking could face prosecution. 3 1 2

Individuals may also be

prosecuted under the 1986 Act if they purposefully attempt to

301. 109 S. Ct. at 2652.
302. Id. at 2653.
303. Id. at 2656.
304. Id. A problem with this answer, however, was that it was essentially
circular, using the basis of one argument to prove another one, and vice versa.
While the Court was most likely within constitutional guidelines in asserting that
the defendant's fifth amendment rights were preserved, it did not substantially
address this issue. Id.
305. See Id. at 2657.
306. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1276 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 881-896).
307. Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3777 (1978) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6)).
308. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988).
309. Kacarab, supra note 280, at 1-5.
310. Id. The Money Laundering Controls Act does not simply focus on cash
transactions between the persons immediately involved in the narcotics transfer,
but applies to any individuals related to the crime only tangentially.
Consequently, the impact of the law is considerably broader than with prior
legislation. Id.
311. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957).
312. See Kacarab, supra note 280, at 2-3. The Act provides for stiff fines,
forfeiture of property, and imprisonment for violation of the Act. Also, any
individual who knowingly accepts laundered money will face these penalties while
also being unable to maintain the benefits of the transaction. Id
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remain ignorant about certain transactions when an ordinary
person would have been alerted to the nature of the trans313
action.
Pursuant to the 1986 Act, the court of appeals in United
States v. Daccarett3 1 4 tested the effectiveness of forfeiture as a tool

for seizing the earnings of narcotics trafficking as the money
passes through the banking system by Electronic Fund Transfers
(EFTs). The court held that warrantless seizure of EFTs does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.3 1 Three associates of the Cali
Cartel had been arrested after opening hundreds of bank
accounts, depositing large sums of money, and conducting
countless EFTs. Twelve million dollars was seized in the United
3 16
States.
According to the Drug Abuse Act as amended in 1978, the
United States government can institute forfeiture in rem
proceedings in three different manners.3 17 First, the government
can follow the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims. Second, the government can obtain a warrant
as prescribed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Finally, the government can seize property without judicial
process "'[wihen the Attorney General has probable cause to
believe that property is subject to civil forfeiture.'" 3 18 In Daccarett
the government seized the funds pursuant to the first and third
options, neither of which requires judicial approval prior to
319
seizure.
Even if the initial seizure is illegal, however, the seized
property can still be forfeited.3 2 0 The government must have
probable cause to seize funds. 3 2 1

If the government lacks

probable cause, the seized assets may not be admitted into
evidence at trial.3 2 2

The property itself, however, is still subject

3
to the forfeiture action. 2
To be a valid warrantless seizure, officials must obtain the
funds pursuant to one of the recognized exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement.3 2 4
The government,

313. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988).
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
'319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993).
See Id. at 48-50.
See Id. at 44.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).
Daccarett,6 F.3d at 48.
Id. at 46.
United States v. $31,990 in U.S. Currency, 982 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1993).
Daccarrett,6 F.3d at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 46.
United States v. LaSanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir. 1992).
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therefore, need not obtain a judicial determination of probable
325
cause prior to the seizure if an extraordinary situation exists.
"[Sluch an extraordinary situation exists when the government
seizes items subject to forfeiture."3 26
The government,
consequently, must have probable cause at the time the clerk
issues the warrant in rem, but the government need not prove

that it has probable cause unless the claimant later challenges
the seizure.3 27 To later prove probable cause, the government
must demonstrate only that a nexus exists between the seized
funds and the narcotics trafficking. 328 ' To show that nexus when
the res is a bank account, the government must establish that
there is probable cause to believe the funds represent proceeds
traceable to drug transactions."329
Under Daccarett, the
government, pursuant to a Fourth Amendment exception,
appears to have the necessary tools to act quickly in order to
seize Cali Cartel funds on their way back to Colombia.
C. Reporting Requirements to DecreaseMoney Laundering
33 0
The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act,
more commonly called the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), delineates
transaction reporting requirements.3'
BSA regulations cover
large currency transactions themselves as well as the
transportation of currency from foreign states and from specific
locations within the United States.3 32 Financial institutions must
report currency transactions in excess of ten thousand dollars. 3
After receiving a transaction over ten thousand dollars, the
financial institution must divulge the identity and occupation of
the individual who conducted the transaction with the institution,
the customer's account number, the identity of the person on
whose behalf the transaction was conducted, as well as a

325. See Daccarett,6 F.3d at 57.

326, United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12 (1983) (citing Caler0Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)).
327. Daccarett,6 F.3d at 57.
328. Id. at 56.
329. Id. at 56.
330. See Id.
331. 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1990).
332. 31 C.F.R. § 103.29 (1990).

333. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a](1) (1990). A "transaction in currency" is "[al
transaction involving the physical transfer of currency from one person to
another. A transaction which is a transfer of funds by means of bank check, bank
draft, wire transfer, or other written order, and which does not include the
physical transfer of currency is not a transaction in currency within the meaning
of this part." Id.
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description of the transaction. 33 4 The Secretary of the Treasury
also has broad discretionary authority to alter the dollar level of
transactions which trigger the reporting requirements. 335 The
Secretary will often alter the levels and the target areas in order
to catch a would be money launderer who believed the threshold
level was higher than it actually was. 338
These reporting
requirement levels are often altered in transactions involving
entities in foreign states or geographic areas where questionable
activities are thought to occur.3 3 7 In addition to these tactics the
Secretary of the Treasury is also able to include electronic fund
transfers (EFrs), wire transfers, bank checks, cashier's checks,
money orders, traveler's checks, and currency transfers in the
reporting requirements. 33 8 BSA attempts to alert federal officials
of possible narcotics related transactions at the earliest possible
339
point in the money laundering chain.
Narcotics traffickers, however, may attempt to avoid these
requirements by seeking an exemption to the reporting
requirements under BSA regulations. 3 4° Deposits and currency
withdrawals "from an existing account by an established
depositor" may receive exemption if the bank chooses to grant the
exemption.3 4 1
Banks, however, do not exercise complete
discretion in granting exemptions and must report any deposits
that "exceed amounts commensurate with the customary conduct
. . . of that customer" and thus appear to be of questionable
origin.342
If a financial institution violates any of these
regulations, it is subject to a civil penalty of up to 100 thousand
dollars per day or the amount involved in the transaction
whichever is greater per day in which the violation occurs. 3 - The

maximum criminal penalty is up to 250 thousand dollars per day
and/or five years imprisonment. 3 4 4

If the underlying money

334. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(e) (1992).
335. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25 (1990).
336. 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(a) (1992).
337. Id.
338. 31 C.F.R. § 103.29 (1993).
339. Sarah N. Weling, Smuifs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal
Law: The Crime of StructuringTransactions, 41 FLA. L. REv. 287, 294 (1989).
340. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(2) (1993); see also Maroldy, supra note 287, at 878.
341. Maroldy, supranote 287, at 878.
342. 31 C.F.R. 103.22(c) (1993); see also Maroldy, supra note 287, at 879.
343. 31 U.S.C. § 532 (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 103.47 (1993); see also Maroldy,
supra note 287, at 879-80.
344. 31 U.S.C. § 532 (1988); 31 C.F.R. § 103.49(b) (1993); see also Maroldy,
supra note 287. at 880-81.
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laundering scheme is known, the maximum penalty is up to 500
5
thousand dollars per day and/or ten years imprisonment.U

D. Anti-Smurfing Statutes
Smurfing is the act of conducting multiple transactions at
different banks or different branches of the same bank on the
same day with funds below the ten thousand dollar trigger for
reporting under BSA.3 4 6 A smurf is an individual who takes
"dirty" narcotics money to various banks and bank branches in
bundles under the ten thousand dollar reporting limit and
obtains cashier's checks or some other medium of exchange. 34 7
Before Congress passed the Money Laundering Control Act
(MLCA),3 48 courts yielded inconsistent and often contradictory
holdings on the legality of smurfling. 3 49 While some courts held
that persons who deposited the cash had a duty to report
deposits over ten thousand dollars, other courts held that only
the banks were responsible for such communications.3 5 0 With
the increasing incidence of smurfing, some courts were willing to
collapse the various transactions that a smurf conducted at
different banks in one day into a lump sum that inevitably
exceeded the ten thousand dollar limit.3 5 1 Only a small number
of courts, however, were initially willing to collapse the multiple
3 52
fraudulent transactions.
Congress passed further legislation to make smurfing a
criminal act to which stiff sanctions attached.353 The new
regulations also redefined the bank reporting requirements and
the definitions of "bank," "financial institution," and "branch," so

as to prevent or at least criminalize any future smurfing.354 This

law also incorporates an accomplice liability provision so that
anyone who even indirectly causes the failure of a bank to report
345. 31 U.S.C. § 532 (1988).
346. Maroldy, supra note 287, at 881.
347. Welling, supra note 339, at 296-97. A smart, or at least a brave, smurf

would often determine when new tellers arrived at banks on their rotation
schedule and redeposit money in the same banks, but with different personnel.
348. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Subtitle M of Title I of the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570. 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as
amended throughout 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
349. Maroldy, supra note 287, at 881.
350. Welling. supranote 339, at 295-96.
351. Maroldy, supra note 287, at 881. Courts viewed the transactions as
fraudulent, purposefully designed to avoid reporting requirements.

352. See Id. at 881-85.
353. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986): see also Welling, supra note 339,
at 299.
354. See WeUing. supra note 339. at 300.
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transactions that legitimately exceed ten thousand dollars is
guilty of a felony.3 55 Even if the smurf attempts to mislead a
bank, but the bank discovers that the transaction is fraudulently
attempting to controvert federal law, courts may still prosecute
35 6
the smurf for violating the attempt language of the statute.
Inducing a bank to file a report containing a material omission or
misstatement also violates the statute. 3 5 7 The main thrust of the
legislation makes structuring financial transactions with intent to
358
avoid the federal reporting requirements a felony.

This recent anti-smurfing legislation has successfully
curtailed money laundering, putting pressure on drug cartels to
develop more sophisticated and creative schemes for money
laundering.3 59
New schemes, however, typically involve
numerous people, large amounts of capital, and networks of shell
corporations and other often legitimate enterprises. The chance
for infiltration into these endeavors, consequently, has increased
markedly, and the rewards for success in even one multi-national
anti-drug operation are tremendous.
In a further attempt to control money laundering, the United
States Treasury will adopt two new programs in the near future:
(1) know-your-customer regulations, and (2) guidelines to help
360
banks recognize activities associated with money laundering.
The first program requires banks to understand the nature of
their customers' businesses.3 6 1 A bank must attempt to piece
together the various transactions of a particular customer to
determine if suspicious activities are occurring.3 6 2 The bank
then may refer to the Treasury Department's list of suspicious
activities. 3 63
Banks, therefore, will not be immune from
36 4
prosecution solely by complying with the Bank Secrecy Act.

355. Id. at 303-04.

This had the affect of making the sanctions of the

legislation more pervasive and applicable to drug traffickers who did not smurf.
but were located several levels up in the hierarchy of various narcotics operations.
356. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343. 1341, 1952 (1982); see also Welling, supra note
339. at 305-06.
357. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (Supp. IV 1986); see also Welling. supra note 339, at
306-07.

358. Welling, supra note 339, at 306-07.
359. See Id.
360. Robyn Meredith, Treasury Planning Changes In Money.Launderlng Rules,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 23, 1993, at 8.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. According to Peter G. Djinis, the director of Treasury's Office of Financial
Enforcement, "Complying with the Bank Secrecy Act will help [banksl a lot."
However, "[elven if you cross all your t's and dot all your is on your currency
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Banks must also take better steps to comply with their three
thousand dollar identification log, which monitors cash
transactions between three thousand and ten thousand dollars.
Banks will now be required to take a more active role in
attempting to curb money laundering.
E. Operation GreenIce
One United States program directed at illicit cartel wealth,
Operation Green Ice, had a significant impact on drug
trafficking. 3 65
This operation directly attacked the money

laundering operations of the Call Cartel and the Italian mafia,
sending a direct and painful message to the cartel.3 6 6 United
States Deputy Attorney General George Terwilliger, stating that
the "aim [of the program was] to drive a stake through the heart
of the illegal drug business by attacking their financial
operations," called the operation a success that dealt a "crippling
36 7
blow" to the Call Cartel.
Operation Green Ice was conducted as a joint effort between
36 8
Italian police and the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.
The domestic part of the operation also incorporated United
States Marshals, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the
Department of the Treasury, and the United States Customs
370
Service. 36 9 The investigation spanned at least seven nations
and involved countless banks, shell corporations, and diverse
individuals. According to the Italian Minister of the Interior
Nicola Mancino, the operation, which began on September 25,
1992, yielded significant quantities of laundered money the
371
"value of which so far can only be determined in cubic meters."
The arrests that resulted, although obviously not putting the Cali

transaction reports, that doesn't mean the bank is going to stay out of trouble."
Id.
365. Colombia Drug Barons Planning Wave of Revenge Killings, REUTERS LIBR.

REP., Oct. 6. 1992, at 1. Operation Green Ice produced one of the largest drug
busts In history. Id.
366. See Michael Hedges, Operation Green Ice Began with Fake Leather Shop,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at A3.

367. Ronald Ostrow & William Montalbano, Agents Break Global Drug Money
Laundry, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at Al.
368. 201 Medellin Couriers Fall into Worldwide Drug Net, MID. EAST NEWS
NErWORK, Sept. 29, 1992, at 1. The operation took ten months of planning and
was the largest drug sting operation to date, yielding significant quantities of drug

money. Id.
369. D.E.A. Press Conf., Sept 28. 1992, at 38.
370. Officials Say 7-Nation DragnetHurt Mafia-ColombiaConnection, CHI. TRIB.,

Sept. 29, 1992, at C8.
371. 201 Medellin CouriersFallInto Worldwide DrugNet, supra note 368, at 1.
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Cartel out of business, 3 were
a major set-back for the cartel
72
according to Terwillinger.
The operation involved a highly sophisticated three year

investigation.

DEA officials established leather good shops

throughout the United States. 3 73 These stores were designed to
create a legitimate paper trail for the cocaine money. 3 74 DEA
operators posed as money laundering facilitators. 3 75 The Cali
Cartel, however, had so much money that some shops were
claiming to sell over twenty million dollars worth of leather goods
annually. 3 7 6 Worried about the possibility of leaks which would

jeopardize both the operation and countless lives of undercover
agents, the DEA decided to act swiftly on the information they
already possessed, rather than risk total failure in an attempt to
3 77
render an even more significant blow to Colombian operations.
In response to the recent expansion of Cali money laundering
operations into Europe, 3 78 Operation Green Ice was devised as a
method of cracking the intricate Call money laundering machine,
the life-blood of the cartel. 3 7 9 The operation also focused on Italy,
the largest European cocaine customer. 38 0 Notwithstanding the
significance of the operation, however, the drug and money
seizure that occurred as a result of Operation Green Ice
381
amounted to only a few days gross capital intake for the cartel.
According to Italy's top anti-Mafia investigator, Liliana Ferraro,
"This is a big success, but I fear it is only the tip of the iceberg.

372. Michael Hedges, Call Cocaine Cartel Dealt 'Crippling Blow', U.S. Says,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at A3.
373. Ostrow & Montalbano, supra note 367, at Al. The operation was very

intricate and involved numerous undercover agents. Seven major Call Cartel
members were arrested and indicted in the United States. This operation
indicates that significant inroads into the central operations of the Call
organization are possible. Operation Green Ice led to the arrest of Jose "Tony The
Pope" Duran. This individual, having over 20 different assumed names, may have
been the most important distributor in the world for Colombian cocaine. The
operation also led to the arrest of over two hundred narcotics related individuals
most of whom are currently awaiting trial in the United States. Id.
374. See Jimmy Burns, International Swoop Cracks Big Cocaine.Smuggling
Ring, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at 6.
375. Seven-Nation Green Ice Effort Deals Blow to Cartels, MONEY LAUNDERING
ALERT, Oct. 1992, at 6.

376. William Drozdak, World Crime Groups Expand Cooperation, Spheres of
Influence, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1992, at A12.
377. See Id.

378. Id.
379. Follow the Money; Operation Green Ice Breaks Up the Call Cartel's
FinancialNetwork, TIME. Oct. 22, 1992, at 26.
380. Officials Say Seven-Nation DragnetHurt Mafla-ColomblaConnection, supra

note 370, at C8.
381. Drozdiak, supranote 376, at A12.
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Drug profits are becoming a major international problem because
they are getting so big that they now affect economic life
everywhere."3 8 2 Exploiting cracks in Cali's money laundering
operations, nevertheless, is a fundamental task in decreasing
narcotics trafficking, and the potential of operations such as
Green Ice should not be underestimated. 3 8 3 Focusing on Call's
asset base could lead to significant enforcement results in a
3 84
relatively short time period.
Other sophisticated DEA operations have resulted in the
5
destruction of Cali operations throughout the United States.38
In December, 1991 federal officials arrested forty-four people in
New York tied to the Cali Cartel.3 86 The raid lead to the
3 7
destruction of a 650 million dollar per year drug operation. B
Because of tougher United States banking regulations, more
Colombian drug money is flowing back to Colombia.3 8 8 During
the 1980s only about ten to twenty percent of the cocaine cash
went back to Colombia, now about fifty percent of the illicit
funds-five billion to seven billion dollars-flows back to
3 89
Colombia.
VII.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S INITIAL DRUG STRATEGY

On October 20, 1993 Drug Czar Lee Brown outlined the
Clinton administration's new drug policy in a thirty-one page
report entitled Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse.3 9 0 Senate
Judiciary Committee members were visibly upset with the vague
and nonsubstantive proposal.3 9 1 The lack of detail in and the
delay in development of the proposal together with a reduction in

382. Id. Ferraro's two previous successors were both murdered by the mafia.

Ferraro states that the mafia had been preparing to take advantage of the relaxing
of borders of the European Community (EC) in 1992. Officials planned Operation
Green Ice at a time appropriate to disrupt Colombian and Italian narcotics
trafficking as the pace Increased dramatically. Id.
383. Id. Not only did the operation yield narcotics and money, but also

weapons and important records necessary for the maintenance and secrecy of
other money laundering operations. Id.
384. Ostrow & Montalbano, supra note 367, at Al.
385. An Editor's Last Story, NEWSDAY, May 11, 1993, at 80.
386. Id.
387. Id. Manuel de Dios Unanue, killed by the Call Cartel, identified Ramiro
Herrera as the head of this operation. This raid also resulted in the elimination of
two Call Cartel "cells" or drug importation units. Id.
388. Farah & Coil, supranote 288, at Al.
389. Id.
390. Just Say "ProbablyNot," WASH TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at A16.
391. Id.
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Lee Brown's staff from 140 people to 25 people furthers an
does not care
impression that the Clinton 3administration
92
sufficiently about the drug issue.

During his campaign President Clinton promised that the
new drug policy would focus on demand-side issues. Long on
rhetoric, the proposal, however, is strikingly similar to Bush's
drug policy.3 9 3 The new drug plan specified that 13.1 billion
dollars would be allocated to the war on drugs with sixty-four
394
percent of that funding going to police and military actions.

While the United States has pledged 6.2 million dollars to support
the three year old underfunded United Nations International
Drug Control Program (UNDCP), such minimal funding appears
to constitute political maneuvering rather than substantive
change. Although adopting an international focus to curbing the
drug trade may have beneficial results, this minor contribution is
not enough.
Brown declared that the new administration would no longer
use the phrase "War on Drugs" because "[wie don't believe a
government should declare war against its own people."3 95 The
United States, however, has already asked and is still asking
Colombia to declare war on its people by curbing the supply of
cocaine. Brown, in fact, while praising Colombia for its anti-drug
efforts, said, "Colombia is demonstrating political will and
commitment. Colombia is hurting the cartels and in return is
paying in blood."3 9 6 Brown, focusing the new drug plan only on
hard core users, further commented, "We need to work on a
manageable scale when dealing with drugs."3 97 These statements
appear to be hypocritical and exhibit a lack of conviction.
The new plan does not appear to offer a change sufficient to
further reduce narcotics trafficking. The current administration
has indicated that supply-side policies are inneffective, yet
without either a new anti-drug strategy or a strong stance against
domestic demand for cocaine, the United States is unlikely to
achieve any promising results in stopping the import of drugs
into the United States. Lee Brown, consequently, will have to

392. Drug Haze, WASH. POST., Oct. 30, 1993. at A20.

393. Patrick

Cockbum,

Washington Losing the Narcotics War, THE

INDEPENDENT, Oct. 30, 1993, at 14.
394. United States: New Drug Policy Draws Fire. INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 21,
1993.

395. Craig Santy, U.S. Drug Czar Plans Attack on Domestic Use, UPI. Oct. 23.
1993.
396. Robert Green, U.S. Official Praises Colombia Anti-Drug Efforts, REUTERS.
Oct. 5, 1993.
397. Id.

1208

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26:1163

more carefully delineate his plan so as not to reduce further his
credibility in Congress and among United States citizens.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The world's narcotics problem is a serious one, requiring
multi-national cooperation and focused objectives. If the United
States wants to curb drug trafficking, the focus of their
operations must shift from Medellin to Call. That process may be
difficult because of the different methods of operation of the two
powerful cartels. The bombings, killings, and kidnappings of the
Medellin Cartel are high profile events on which the media have
widely reported. The Cali Cartel, however, typically uses more
subdued methods of securing their narcotics enterprise. Public
outcry, consequently, often shaped through the media, is
concentrated on the Medellin Cartel. The Cali Cartel, however,
produces most of the world's cocaine. 3 9 8 To reduce the supply of
cocaine, the necessity of a shift in focus is clearly apparent.
Governments use various techniques to curb narcotics
trafficking. Most of these enforcement techniques, however, are
unsuccessful. The two strategies with the most potential are
Irregular rendition and asset attachment. The Cali Cartel is a
sophisticated machine that invests its drug created wealth in
both legal and illegal operations. Infiltrating these operations,
determining the players in the Cali cocaine trade, and uncovering
the flow of these assets could have a profound affect on Cali
operations. The Second Circuit's recent decision in United States
v. Daccarett appears to provide the necessary legal weapons to
seize EFTs and disrupt the Cali financial empire. Operation
Green Ice also indicates the scale of success that governments
have achieved and can achieve again in the future through
careful anti-money laundering sting operations.
Once governments uncover the persons involved in drug
transactions, the government can employ irregular rendition to
bring cartel members to justice in the United States. United
States v. Alvarez-Machain3 99 provides a strong weapon for United
States officials to abduct those narcotics traffickers whom it is
able to locate. 40 0 In order to enhance the effectiveness of irregular

398. Davison, supranote 105, at 13.
399. 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
400. Locating many of the elite drug barons, however, is often difficult as

indicated by Pablo Escobar's ability to evade an elite army and police search team,
and the Call Cartel, among other militant groups.
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to
rendition, foreign states must cooperate with the United States
40 1
form a cohesive alliance in the war against the drug barons.
A united effort focused on the economic wealth of the Cali
Multi-national operations,
Cartel is, therefore, necessary.
Once compromised, these
however, may expose operatives.
individuals are essentially dead, 40 2 given narcotics traffickers
history of violence toward those individuals who attempt to
disrupt their cocaine operations. The task, consequently, wil be
difficult, but, nonetheless, necessary to curb the narcotics trade
on which governments have spent billions of dollars and lost
countless lives with only minimal success.
As President Bush stated in a speech referring to strategies
to combat illegal narcotics, 'The game has changed." To date,
however, the game has principally been played on the terms of
Colombian cartels have successfully
the drug lords.
demonstrated that they have both the will and the resources to
win the waiting game. That must stop, and states must play a

new game in which they vigorously work together to execute a
well-defined attack on illicit cartel wealth.
Gregory Wilson

401. Foreign states, particularly Colombia, play an integral role in locating the
drug barons. Although South American states often damn any United States
intervention in their affairs and desire to prosecute drug lords unilaterally, this
approach is not sufficient to solve the drug problem. The Call and Medellin
Cartels have strongly asserted that they do not fear the Colombian government
and are willing and able to survive a protracted war in Colombia.
402. Even people in the United States are no longer safe. The Cali Cartel is
willing to send hit men into the United States to silence opposition as indicated by
the murder of the Journalist, Manuel de Dios Unanue. 3 Plead Guilty In Killing of
Anti-Drug Writer, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1993, at 10.

